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ABSTRACT
This Article sets out a comprehensive account of rational punish-
ment theory and examines its implications for criminal law reform.
Specifically, what offenses should be subjected to criminal punish-
ment, and how should we punish? Should we use prison sentences or
fines, and when should we use them? Should some conduct be left to
a form of market punishment through private lawsuits? Should fines
be used to fund the criminal justice system? The answers I offer
address some of the most important public policy issues of the mo-
ment, such as mass incarceration and the use of fines to finance law
enforcement. The framework of this Article is firmly grounded in
rational deterrence policy, and yet points toward reforms that would
soften or reduce the scope of criminal punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
Economics and criminal law have long been viewed as odd part-
ners. Economics stresses rationality and has been referred to at
times as the science or study of rational choice.1 Criminal law, by
contrast, often applies to subjects who do not appear to behave
rationally.2 Criminals are thought to behave impulsively, and there
is even genetic evidence suggesting a tendency toward impulsive-
ness among convicted violent criminals.3 One recent study suggests
that the propensity toward criminality is strongly related to one’s
psychological ability to postpone gratification, an ability that ap-
pears to be formed early in life.4
People who are suspicious about the application of economics, or
more generally about a “rational incentives framework,” to crime
would probably fear that such a framework would generate inef-
fective punishments by doing a poor job of taking into account the
weak link between rationality and the behavior of criminals.5 One
possible shortcoming is that the rationality model might lead to the
imposition of outrageous punishments, such as those proposed by
Jeremy Bentham, to make sure that the punishment system catches
1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1 (3d ed. 1986).
2. On the reasons for this perception, see Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia
in Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 149,
149-50 (1991); Alon Harel, Behavioural Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey, 2 BERGEN J.
CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 32, 34-35 (2014); and Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment,
and the Psychology of Self-Control, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 511-12 (2012). See generally Richard
H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics, in 3 CRIMINAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS 403, 413-26 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2d ed. 2009).
3. On genetics and criminal behavior, see, for example, Andy Coghlan, ‘Impulsivity Gene’
Found in Violent Offenders, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 23, 2010), https://www.newscientist.com/
article/dn19903-impulsivity-gene-found-in-violent-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/Q99Z-LPPF];
Genes and Behaviour: Next Candidate, ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/science-and-technology/21629223-more-evidence-certain-versions-some-genes-can-
encourage-violence-next [https://perma.cc/G5MW-BUWK]; and Adrian Raine, The Criminal
Mind, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2013, 7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873
23335404578444682892520530 [https://perma.cc/8JQM-X87L].
4. See Robert M. Sapolsky, A Criminal Trait in the Refusal to Wait?, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
2, 2016, 1:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-criminal-trait-in-the-refusal-to-wait-14781
07218 [https://perma.cc/PE6H-ZH72] (finding the highest probability of future criminal
behavior in children who cannot wait to receive a marshmallow).
5. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 178-82 (2004). 
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the attention of potential criminals.6 Alternatively, the rationality
framework might generate harsh punishments to make up for the
risk of nondetection of criminal activity.7 Another possible distor-
tion, in the opposite direction, is that a rationality framework might
counsel in favor of weak punishments, or no punishments at all, on
the theory that it makes no sense to punish a criminal after the
crime has been committed, because the crime is a sunk cost in
relation to society’s welfare after it has occurred.8
6. On Bentham’s unusual and perhaps outrageous punishments, see JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 60-61 (1830).
7. A long-standing policy in the deterrence literature is that fines or damages should be
multiplied by the inverse of the probability of detection to prevent deterrence from being
diluted by the likelihood of nondetection. For discussion of this policy, see Keith N. Hylton &
Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 388, 388-91
(2005). The inverse probability multiplier policy lends support to harsh punishments for
crimes that are difficult to detect. See id. Gary Becker, in his seminal economic analysis of
punishment, noted that his economic model offered a positive account for harsh punishments
used in the past, when enforcement capabilities were limited. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 184 (1968) (“There was a tendency
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Anglo-Saxon countries, and even today in
many Communist and underdeveloped countries, to punish those convicted of criminal
offenses rather severely, at the same time that the probability of capture and conviction was
set at rather low values. A promising explanation of this tendency is that an increased
probability of conviction obviously absorbs public and private resources in the form of more
policemen, judges, juries, and so forth.” (footnote omitted)). Because of this aspect of his
article, Becker’s policy has sometimes been compared to a “boil[ ] [him] in oil” approach to en-
forcement. See Alon Harel, Criminal Law as an Efficiency-Enhancing Device: The Contribu-
tion of Gary Becker, in FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 297, 308 (Markus D.
Dubber ed., 2014). 
8. To elaborate, if there were no deterrent effect from punishment, it would be irrational
to punish. This is connected to the reasoning of the chain store paradox. See Reinhard Selten,
The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 127, 131-32 (1978). On the last day of
earth, according to the paradox, it would be irrational to punish because there could not be
a deterrent effect. Reasoning backward, it would not make sense to punish the day before the
last day, and the day before that, and so on. Showing an awareness of this paradox, and
rejecting utilitarianism as an approach to punishment, Immanuel Kant argued that on the
last day of earth, the last murderer sitting in prison should be executed:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members (e.g.,
if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the
world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed,
so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not
cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise
the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
353, 474 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
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This Article sets out a comprehensive account of rational
punishment theory and spells out its implications for criminal law
reform. Specifically, what offenses should be subjected to criminal
punishment, and how should we punish? Should we use prison
sentences or fines, and when should we use them? Should some
conduct be left to a form of market punishment through private
lawsuits? Should fines be used to fund the criminal justice system?9
The answers I offer address some of the most important public
policy issues of the moment, such as mass incarceration and the use
of fines to finance law enforcement. The Department of Justice, in
its report on Ferguson, Missouri, concluded that the unfair use of
fines as a method of financing the local criminal justice system
violated civil rights laws,10 in addition to giving rise to anti-police
protests during 2015.11 The issues are broader, however, than
reflected in the current unrest over criminal law enforcement. In
antitrust enforcement, a topic that generates few if any street
protests, there is a current problem of multiple punishments and
even multiple prison sentences imposed on firms and employees
who violate competition laws.12 Some have called for more rational-
ity and coordination in global antitrust enforcement.13
The problems at the heart of the current unrest over criminal law
enforcement and concerns raised in antitrust enforcement require
9. On fees imposed to finance the criminal justice system, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 154-55 (2010)
(describing the recent practice of charging newly released prisoners the wide-ranging costs
associated with their incarceration); and Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1706, 1727-33 (2015) (listing usage fees, for-profit probation supervision, and civil for-
feiture among the various mechanisms used to finance the criminal justice system).
10. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ ferguson_police_department_report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WD22-AVHZ].
11. See id. at 27; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces Findings of Two Civil Rights Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri (Mar. 4, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-two-civil-rights-
investigations-ferguson-missouri [https://perma.cc/LYQ3-FCV7].
12. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940
(2001); John Terzaken & Pieter Huizing, How Much Is Too Much? A Call for Global Principles
to Guide the Punishment of International Cartels, ANTITRUST, Spring 2013, at 53, 53 ; Spencer
Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 207-08
(2003).
13. See, e.g., Terzaken & Huizing, supra note 12, at 56.
2518 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2513
a reexamination of some of the same fundamental issues. A reform
plan should be broad enough to address both sets of complaints.
However, a reexamination of fundamental issues requires a
theoretical framework capable of addressing such issues. My aim is
to offer such a framework, mainly by unifying some disparate
approaches that already exist in the literature. The framework of
this Article is firmly grounded in rational deterrence policy, and yet
points toward reforms that would soften or reduce the scope of
criminal punishment. Specifically, the suggested reforms would oust
criminal law from the regulation of many market exchanges (for
example, marijuana sales), sharply limit the use of prison as a form
of punishment, and place stringent conditions on the use of fines to
finance law enforcement.
This Article’s framework integrates the standard model of ration-
al criminal deterrence, which had its first flowering in 1764 through
the work of Cesare Beccaria,14 with public choice theory,15 which
emphasizes the incentives of enforcement agents.16 The standard
model on its own implies optimal limits, often overlooked, for the
scope of criminal law enforcement. Part of the contribution of this
Article’s framework is in identifying optimal scope limitations
implied by standard deterrence theory. Public choice theory re-
inforces and adds to these limitations, helps explain anomalous
features of law enforcement (such as the occasional hobbling of
enforcement agents by corruption), and offers reasons for policing
the optimal scope limitations to ensure that self-interested enforce-
ment agents do not push the scope of criminal law beyond its
optimal boundaries.
One of the goals of the rational incentives framework is to take
criminal law policy-theorizing away from arguments that point to
the essential nature of the offender, an argument that easily drifts
14. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 43 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-
Merrill 1963) (1764).
15. For a survey of public choice theory by one of its founders, see Gordon Tullock, Public
Choice, in 6 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 722, 722-27 (Steven N. Durlauf
& Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). One aspect of public choice theory, rent-seeking, is
core to this analysis. The rent-seeking literature is thought to have originated with Gordon
Tullock. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON.
J. 224, 231-32 (1967).
16. See Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal
Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 72-78 (2007).
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into theories of genetic or cultural determinism. Such theories are
often unhelpful as guides to state policy, especially in the area of
criminal law. The rational incentives framework views criminals
and noncriminals as essentially the same, and controlled by the
same incentives to seek advantage for themselves. It is the goal of
the state to ensure that the incentives set up by the offender’s en-
vironment, including the law, do not encourage socially undesirable
behavior. In every instance in which such behavior is observed, this
framework starts with the presumption that it can be attributed to
rational incentives.
I. RATIONAL DETERRENCE POLICY AND CRIME
The rational model of punishment has been around for quite a
long time.17 I will make no effort here to rehash the theory in detail.
Instead, I will briefly review the theory and move directly into its
application.
The rational incentives framework began with Beccaria and
Bentham and stressed the elimination of the prospect of gain to the
criminal.18 While this is not a surprising proposition, their argu-
ments began a revolution in thinking on criminal law enforcement.
Beccaria single-handedly introduced Enlightenment thinking into
law enforcement policy. Like other Enlightenment thinkers, Bec-
caria dispensed with notions that normative judgments should be
determined by tradition or references to what seemed appropriate
in the Old Testament.19 He replaced this traditional mode of think-
ing, in the area of criminal law jurisprudence, with a rational in-
centives model that posited that the purpose of punishment is to
deter crime.20 Punishment should therefore aim to take the gain
out of crime, but not more than the level required to eliminate the
gain.21 Harsher punishments, in Beccaria’s view, worsened crime
17. For a brief history, see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory
of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 425-27 (1998).
18. See, e.g., BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 42-44; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon
Press 1996) (1789).
19. See BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 42-44.
20. See id. at 42.
21. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 17, at 425-27.
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by inducing correspondingly harsh views on the part of the public
and of potential criminals.22
The mechanism by which harsh punishments would coarsen crim-
inals was not clear in Beccaria’s account. Beccaria suggested that
harsh punishments reflected a set of unforgiving norms adopted
within society, and that those norms infected the punished as much
as the punishers.23 Under this theory, criminals, seeing that they
would be harshly dealt with, would find no reason to be lenient
toward their victims.24 Each victim, in a sense, represented the state
that promised to torture the criminal, and therefore could be treated
badly as a matter of reciprocal dealing. Punishment, in Beccaria’s
framework, therefore included a component that sought to educate
the punished and to inculcate a type of civic virtue.25
Bentham continued with Beccaria’s project but merged it with a
theory of preferences and a sharper focus on incentives. Bentham
gave more thought to the types of punishment necessary to elimi-
nate the prospect of gain.26 For example, given the impulsiveness
and low rationality of criminals, Bentham thought it important to
have punishments that were “characteristic” of the crime itself—so
that a rapist, for example, would face the prospect of castration, or
a thief the prospect of having his hands cut off.27 Bentham also
introduced the theory of marginal deterrence as a justification for
moderating punishments.28 Under this theory, punishments should
be moderated to the level necessary to eliminate the gain, because
otherwise the punishment itself could induce more destructive
behavior.29 For example, if the punishment for purse snatching and
22. See BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 43-44.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 94-95.
26. See Hylton, supra note 17, at 426-27.
27. See BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 86-93 (suggesting deformation and mutilation as
possible punishments); id. at 60-61 (suggesting punishment of the “Offending Member”—for
example—“[i]n punishing the crime of forgery, the hand of the offender may be transfixed by
an iron instrument fashioned like a pen”).
28. See id. at 35-36 (“When two offences come in competition, the punishment for the
greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.”). For a more recent
discussion on marginal deterrence theory, see generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum
Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970) (discussing the most recent updates on the
marginal deterrence theory).
29. See BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 62; BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 168.
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murder were the same (execution), a purse snatcher who believed
that he would be executed would choose to murder his victim to
make it easier to take the purse. The marginal deterrence theory
offered an alternative to Beccaria’s comparatively fuzzy educational
theory of punishment, and one that generated specific implications
for the level of punishment.
This Classical deterrence model has been at the core of rational
punishment theory since the contributions of Beccaria and Benth-
am. By focusing on gain elimination, both theorists indicated that
punishment authorities should attempt to individualize punish-
ments to the characteristics of the offender.30 Both indicated that
punishments should be more severe as the probability of detection
declined. Both indicated that punishment should be more severe as
the distance in time between offense (receipt of gain to the offender)
and punishment increased.31 The differences were in fuzzier areas.
Bentham stressed the psychology of offenders in the determination
of an appropriate punishment.32 Beccaria stressed the educational
function of punishment, and its concomitant need to uphold social
norms of individual respect and mercy in operation.33
The Classical Deterrence Theory of Beccaria and Bentham re-
mains influential today. The major modern innovation in rational
punishment thinking was Gary Becker’s theory of punishment in
1968.34 Becker argued that the goal of punishment should be to
internalize the social costs of criminal activity rather than to
eliminate the gains.35 There are a number of reasons for this change
in focus. Most importantly, the criminal justice system has ex-
panded beyond common law crimes (for example, murder, mayhem,
rape, battery, burglary, and theft)36 to encompass many activities
30. See BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 62; BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 168 (“The punishment
should be adjusted in such manner to each particular offence, that for every part of the
mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender from giving birth to it.”).
31. BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 64; BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 170 (declaring that
“[p]unishment must be further increased in point of magnitude, in proportion as it falls short
in point of proximity”).
32. See BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 168.
33. See BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 95.
34. See Becker, supra note 7, at 169-70.
35. See Hylton, supra note 17, at 426-27.
36. On common law crimes generally, see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 176-219 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1769). 
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that are business practices and types of market exchange (for
example, price fixing).37 According to Becker, for such activities,
internalization is the proper goal to seek in order to maximize social
welfare.38 For activities that generally enhance society’s welfare—
that is, when the gains to society generally exceed the losses to vic-
tims—internalization would shift the losses to the source of the
activity and appropriately discourage the activity without necessar-
ily shutting it down.39 For example, making a railroad pay for the
losses imposed on victims of rail accidents would discourage some
rail service while at the same time permitting it to continue when
the benefits, as reflected by profits, were greater than the harms.
The second reason to prefer internalization is that it works just as
well as gain elimination whenever the latter goal would be prefera-
ble.40 Again, suppose railroads were inefficient, in the sense that the
gains to society were less than the accident losses imposed on
victims. Under internalization, rail service would be forced to shut
down because the losses internalized would wipe out the profits of
the railroads.
Becker’s internalization approach implies, consistent with the
Classical model, that the severity of punishment should vary
inversely with the probability of detection. Thus, crimes that are
unlikely to be detected should be punished more harshly, other
things being equal.41 Becker’s analysis implies, under certain con-
ditions, that the ideal penalty can be determined by dividing the
social loss due to the crime by the probability of detection.42 The
costs of enforcement can be minimized by reducing the amount of
resources put into enforcement, thus lowering the probability of
detection and increasing the penalty.43 In stark terms, the Becker
model implies that an optimal enforcement system might consist of
a single enforcement agent who, unable to capture the vast majority
37. See Becker, supra note 7, at 169, 172.
38. See id. at 193, 204, 208.
39. See id. at 194, 196, 204.
40. See id. at 194, 196.
41. See id. at 176-79.
42. On the use of fines as punishment against risk-neutral agents, see A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability
of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133, 133-34 (1992) (determining the optimal fines to punish risk-
neutral agents for committing harms by factoring in the chance of not being detected). 
43. See Becker, supra note 7, at 169, 176-79.
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of offenders, makes up for the shortfall in volume by imposing an
extremely harsh penalty on each offender he catches. However, such
a system would also have to incorporate marginal deterrence con-
cerns to avoid encouraging criminals to choose the most harmful
method of carrying out their crimes—that is, from making the crime
fit the punishment.44
Minimizing enforcement costs also explains why imprisonment
would not generally be the preferred method of punishment under
the Becker model. Imprisonment is an especially costly form of
punishment, and forfeits the labor of the convicted criminal while
he serves his sentence.45 Resources could be saved by reducing the
length of the sentence or eliminating incarceration, and substituting
a monetary penalty or some other deterrent such as a system of pro-
bation and monitoring.46
Speed and efficiency are prized under the internalization model.
As long as social losses are internalized, there would be no apparent
need to impose obstacles such as a high burden of proof for law en-
forcers. Because the goal of internalization is not to completely deter
a particularly malicious activity,47 discovering the intentions of the
offender is not important. There is no need to set up procedural
obstacles for the purpose of separating the genuinely vicious from
the merely awkward. Such obstacles would only increase the cost of
enforcement without enhancing the accuracy of the enforcement
system.
A. Neoclassical Deterrence Theory
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed,48 and later Richard
Posner,49 took important steps in reconciling these alternative ra-
tional punishment frameworks. In the Calabresi-Melamed-Posner
44. On the marginal deterrence theory as an accompaniment to Becker’s theory, see
Stigler, supra note 28, at 527-29.
45. See Becker, supra note 7, at 179-80.
46. See id. at 179-80, 207-08.
47. See id. at 180.
48. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-94, 1096-97 (1972).
49. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1195 (1985).
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framework, the gain elimination policy is ideal whenever the burden
of transacting is low, so that the potential victim and the potential
criminal could bargain over the transfer of some entitlement from
the victim to the offender.50 Thus, if a criminal wishes to gain
ownership of the victim’s car, the criminal could simply negotiate
over the purchase with the victim. When the burden of transacting
is high, and the underlying transfer potentially welfare enhancing,
then the loss internalization approach is preferable under this hy-
brid model, because it optimally regulates transfers by disincentiv-
izing any transfer when the gain is less than the loss.51 Because
this framework reconciles the Classical deterrence model with Beck-
er, it may appropriately be referred to as the Neoclassical Deter-
rence Model.
As a positive theory of the common law, the Neoclassical model is
far superior to either the complete deterrence (Beccaria, Bentham)
or internalization (Becker) frameworks. Viewing tort law as a sys-
tem of punishment, it clearly does not seek, as a general matter, to
eliminate the entire gain from activities that generate torts.52 If it
did so, it would have shuttered many businesses such as railroads.
Tort liability seeks instead to internalize losses.53 Adopting tort lia-
bility for accidents on the roads is consistent with the Neoclassical
model because the underlying activities are socially beneficial and
transaction costs prevent potential injurers and victims from
allocating risks in advance. By contrast, criminal law appears to
have complete deterrence as its goal; this is also consistent with the
Neoclassical model. The underlying activities are often not socially
beneficial (such as robbery) and the offenses are often takings that
in theory could have been arranged through a market transaction.54
The Neoclassical model suggests that internalization should be
left to the tort system and complete deterrence to the criminal
50. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48, at 1093-94, 1096-97; Posner, supra note 49,
at 1195.
51. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48, at 1093-94, 1096-97; Posner, supra note 49,
at 1195.
52. However, gain elimination does appear to be the goal of tort law in the area of punitive
damages. See Hylton, supra note 17, at 439. 
53. See id. at 421.
54. See Posner, supra note 49, at 1195-98.
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justice system.55 There are many reasons to believe that the tort
system is a comparatively superior system for internalization. First,
the tort system has an advantage in motivating enforcers: it enables
victims to sue for losses, and one cannot be sure that public agents
working in the criminal justice system will be equally motivated to
internalize the losses of victims. Second, the tort system has an
advantage in the proof of loss: it enables victims to use their own
private information about their losses to prove the magnitude of
loss in each instance.56 The public agents employed by the criminal
justice system have no special information on the losses suffered by
victims. Third, the criminal justice system is geared primarily to-
ward prohibition and preemption.57 The process of apprehension and
prosecution (including evidence gathering) is consistent with the
general goal of preemption because it seeks to stop harms before
they occur and to use extraordinary means to apprehend offenders.
Offenders apprehended under the criminal justice system may
sometimes be apprehended before the offense occurs and subjected
to harsh and intrusive discovery methods. Such an approach would
be inappropriate when the state’s goal is merely to internalize rath-
er than preempt losses. Fourth, criminal law enforcement inevitably
entails some degree of public defamation of suspected offenders,
because of the nature of the general category of offenses.58 To be
labeled a “criminal suspect” is to be put in the same category as sus-
pected murderers, kidnappers, et cetera. Such publicly defamatory
treatment of suspected offenders would be excessive in instances in
which the mere internalization of losses, while allowing the under-
lying activity giving rise to the loss to continue, is the accepted goal
of enforcement.
55. At least in retrospect, taking the current allocation of enforcement as given, the
Neoclassical model offers a rationalization. However, as a matter of initial design, the
Neoclassical model seems to offer no prescription on the choice between public and private
enforcement of law. The fact that offenders are often judgment-proof might provide a justifi-
cation for public enforcement within the Neoclassical model. However, the judgment-proof
problem provides a rather insecure foundation for public enforcement.
56. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 42, at 46.
57. See Hylton, supra note 17, at 421.
58. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 49, at 1205, 1224.
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Just as the tort system has a comparative advantage in internal
izing losses, the criminal justice system has a comparative advan-
tage in completely deterring socially harmful activity. First, the
prohibitory and preemptive functions of punishment are often best
carried out by the criminal enforcement system than by private
litigation. Private plaintiffs are unlikely to take on the preemptive
role because it is costly and because doing so would provide an
unremunerative public good.59 The individually rational thing to do
would be to free ride on the enforcement effort of others. The pro-
hibitory and preemptive functions require investigation and crime
detection efforts in many cases.60 Private individuals would not have
incentives to investigate crimes, and would free ride on the efforts
of any private individuals who took on the burden of investigation
and detection.61 Even victims of consummated crimes may be unable
or unwilling to bring an action against the perpetrator: the victim
could be dead or disabled, or fear retribution from the offender. For
these reasons, the criminal justice system is preferable when the
goal of enforcement is complete deterrence.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE AND CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
The Neoclassical model is incomplete as a positive theory of crim-
inal law, and raises serious questions as a normative theory too. The
model’s most significant flaw is its failure to incorporate the prob-
lem of rent-seeking—or, more generally, public choice theory—in
the theory of optimal law enforcement.62
A system of harsh punishments encourages rent-seeking—for
example, bribe-taking—on the part of law enforcement officials. A
mundane account of rent-seeking in law enforcement was offered in
59. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 42, at 46.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. On the public choice model of law enforcement, see David Friedman, Why Not Hang
Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment, 107 J. POL. ECON. S259, S262-63 (1999); and
Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 72-78; see also Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Political Economy of Criminal Procedure, in 3 CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 2, at 171, 184-85. On public choice considerations and the enactment of criminal statutes,
see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 715, 735-37 (2013).
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a recent article in The Economist on corruption in Sierra Leone.63
The article begins:
At a busy intersection in downtown Freetown, motorbike-taxi
drivers wait for customers. They pass the time telling tales of
petty corruption. “Yesterday I was chased by two policemen,”
says a young man, slouched forward on his bike seat. “They told
me I was violating a law when I wasn’t, and confiscated my
motorbike. I had to pay 100,000 leones ($18) to get it back.” Two
other drivers butt in, eager to trump his story with their own.64
The experience of the motorbike driver should be predicted in a
regime in which law enforcement agents act rationally to maximize
their income at opportune moments. The incentives for enforcement
agents to behave in the same manner as do the police in Sierra
Leone exist to some degree in every law enforcement regime.65
Rent-seeking provides a direct mechanism by which unnecessar-
ily harsh punishments can cause social welfare to decline—a view
that is consistent with Beccaria’s arguments concerning the adverse
effects of harsh punishment but never alluded to in his work. As the
harshness of penalties increases, law enforcement agents have
greater leverage with which to seek bribes, which can be demanded
of the guilty and the innocent alike.66 For example, if the law
subjected jaywalkers to the death penalty, an unnecessarily harsh
punishment to deter such a crime, then law enforcement agents
could threaten each jaywalker with execution, and in return for
declining to arrest, demand an exorbitant payment as tribute. For
the same reason, the criminal justice system must constrain the dis-
cretion of law enforcers, for otherwise each enforcer could target
individuals for bribes, or could carry out their work at the behest of
private individuals or groups.67 These observations imply that the
criminal justice system should be saddled with constraints to ensure
63. See Corruption in Sierra Leone: Call It in, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.
economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21710282-putting-technology-work-root-out-graft-
call-it [https://perma.cc/K6TK-BRLG].
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 72-78.
66. See, e.g., id.
67. See id.
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that it is not used as a method of enrichment for enforcement
agents, or as a method of predation among social factions.
This public choice perspective on criminal justice, which views
law enforcement agents as self-interested utility maximizers,68 pre-
sents implications that oppose many of those of the internalization
theory, and temper those of the Classical (or complete) deterrence
model. Consider, for example, the number of enforcement agents.
Whereas the internalization approach would reduce the number of
agents and substitute a more severe penalty to maintain deterrence,
the public choice model recommends retaining a sufficient number
of agents to make bribery difficult to conceal.69 Consider also the
notion, from the internalization model, of reducing the probability
of enforcement and increasing the penalty. Such a policy would
make the problem of rent-seeking even greater because it would be
far easier for an enforcement agent to threaten to impose an enor-
mous fine against any individual he chose to target.
Compared to the complete deterrence model, the public choice
perspective provides a stronger and more consistent reason for
moderating punishments than the norm-centered arguments of
Beccaria. Setting punishments well above the minimum necessary
to completely deter offensive conduct would exacerbate the rent-
seeking problem.70 Hence, minimizing the excess above the mini-
mum necessary to completely deter—that is, taking the fat out of
the penalty—and constraining official discretion may be important
tools for controlling the predatory incentives of enforcement agents.
The rent-seeking model would impose a high burden of proof on the
enforcement agent to minimize the agent’s discretion to punish.71
The reasonable-doubt rule, enshrined in In Re Winship as the
prosecutor’s burden of proof for a criminal conviction under the
68. See id.
69. Obviously, bribery can be deterred by punishing agents who accept bribes. But it is
unlikely that bribery can be eliminated in every setting. Agents’ rewards from bribery may
be too high relative to the expected penalties to completely eliminate corruption in enforce-
ment. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkoviæ, To Serve and Collect: Measuring Police Corruption, 93 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 637 (2003) (noting the relatively low frequency of successful
punishments against police officers engaging in lucrative bribes).
70. Cf. Hylton & Khanna, supra note 62, at 184-85.
71. See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 68-72 (discussing the public choice theory of
the reasonable-doubt rule).
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Due Process Clause,72 is a direct implication of the public choice
model.73
Under the public choice model, the degree of rent-seeking or cor-
ruption associated with criminal law enforcement depends on two
variables: the degree of discretion given to enforcement agents and
the punishment stakes for the offender.74 As the degree of discretion
increases, the enforcer has greater power to seek a bribe or to seek
some end that favors a particular individual or group with which he
is affiliated. As the punishment stakes increase, the enforcer is in
a better position, other things equal, to demand a bribe, and the
offenders—or others involved in the criminalized activity—are more
likely to offer a bribe. Another factor that generates corruption is
the difference between punishment stakes and the compensation of
enforcers.75 As the monetary punishment stakes increase relative to
the compensation of enforcers, the scope for mutually agreeable
bribes increases.76
The incentive to bribe an enforcement agent who has discretion-
ary authority will inevitably be limited by the offender’s ability to
protect himself from predatory demands from the enforcement
agent. Suppose the offender wishes to continue in some potentially
unlawful enterprise, but must pay a continuing bribe to avoid ap-
prehension. If the enforcement agent’s discretion to demand bribes
were unlimited, what would keep the agent from demanding all of
the wealth of the offender? The risk of being revealed by the
offender as an unfaithful enforcement agent is one potential limit,
but this may be insufficient—the offender’s desire to operate in
secrecy may prevent him from publicly disclosing his bribery of the
agent. A more likely outcome is that the offender responds with
force to protect his wealth or the earnings from his unlawful enter-
prise. Thus, as discretion expands and the differential between pun-
ishment stakes and enforcer compensation increases, one should
observe both an increase in the incentives for bribery and other
forms of rent-seeking and an increase in the coercive force potential
72. 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
73. See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 68-72.
74. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 62, at S267-68; Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at
104-06.
75. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 42, at 72-73.
76. See, e.g., id.
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of offenders. Such an increase may lead to an “arms race” in coercive
force between enforcement agents and offenders, resulting in exces-
sive arms held by offenders and the militarization of enforcement
agents.77
Rent-seeking in enforcement distorts enforcement incentives and
undermines the deterrent effect of law enforcement. Corrupted en-
forcement agents may target innocent individuals for punishment
and at the same time avoid apprehending the guilty. This approach
to law enforcement reduces the differential in the expected penalty
faced by innocent and guilty actors, and thereby weakens the incen-
tive to comply with the law, generating more crime.78 In addition, as
such distortions become more common, individuals will have greater
incentives to bribe agents to avoid being punished arbitrarily. Thus,
rent-seeking leads to greater costs from crime and at the same,
costlier enforcement activity by corrupted agents.
Because of the costs of corruption, penalties should be moderated
and the discretion of enforcers circumscribed. These suggestions
are borne out in the law in the United States. Prison sentences for
many crimes, such as burglary, could be set considerably higher and
still remain consistent with the complete deterrence goal.79 That
they have not been set as high as even the internalization model
would recommend may reflect a general awareness of the adverse
consequences of unnecessarily severe punishments. Several criminal
procedure rules appear to be designed to limit prosecutorial discre-
tion; public choice considerations easily explain this.80
The worrisome implications of enforcement discretion have been
on display in many countries, especially China. There, individual
police officers have had the nearly unfettered power, until recently,
to incarcerate individuals, without a criminal conviction, in re-edu-
cation camps within the laojiao system81—the parallel and larger
77. Cf. RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S
POLICE FORCES 33 (2013).
78. See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 80-81 (discussing deterrence under corrupt
enforcement). 
79. See Richard P. Adelstein, Institutional Function and Evolution in the Criminal Pro-
cess, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 41 (1981).
80. See Hylton and Khanna, supra note 16, at 84-90, 104-06 (using the public choice model
to explain the reasonable-doubt rule, double jeopardy rule, ex post facto prohibition, void for
vagueness doctrine, and other rules of criminal procedure).
81. For more on the laojiao system, see, for example, Labour Camps: Demanding Justice,
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laogai system of camps housing criminal convicts.82 The unfettered
discretion to assign individuals into the laojiao system gave each
police officer the power to demand bribes from individuals who
wished to avoid being imprisoned.83 The Chinese government recent-
ly imposed restrictions on this discretion, limiting officers’ power to
incarcerate to a few types of offenders, such as drug addicts.84 This
limitation may not be effective, because provincial governments may
not ensure perfect compliance with the central government’s orders,
and, more importantly, police officers retain the discretion to deter-
mine whether an individual falls within one of the permitted cate-
gories for imprisonment in the laojiao system.85
In June 2016, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, responding to a
spate of terrorist murders, ordered his police to pursue individuals
suspected of terrorist sympathies, leading to over ten thousand ar-
rests.86 Some speculated that aside from the benefit to the Prime
Minister from incarcerating political opponents, one important rea-
son for such a broad order was to enable the police to collect bribes.87
The average bribe to free an individual after an arrest was between
$102-$255, and up to $1250 could be charged to free a member of
the local Islamist political party, Jamaat-e-Islami.88 Because the
average police pay was only $250 per month, an officer could earn
as much as a half-year’s salary by arresting a Jamaat activist.89
ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21561937 [https://perma.cc/X4HA-
PKDZ].
82. See Minami Funakoshi, China’s ‘Re-Education Through Labor’ System: The View from
Within, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/
chinas-re-education-through-labor-system-the-view-from-within/272913/ [https://perma.cc/
38XF-UXYR].
83. See Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Labor Camps Widens in China, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/opposition-to-labor-camps-widens-in-
china.html [https://perma.cc/QJ6T-SPRK].
84. See, e.g., Labour Camps: Long Overdue, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2013), https://www.
economist.com/news/china/21569448-government-says-it-will-reform-its-system-labour-camps-
long-overdue [https://perma.cc/472U-CEES].
85. See id.
86. See Mass Arrests in Bangladesh: Round up the Usual Suspects, ECONOMIST (June 18,
2016), https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21700669-spate-assassinations-provokes-heavy-
handed-response-round-up-usual-suspects [https://perma.cc/ZN8R-2B9R].
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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III. TYPES OF PUNISHMENT REGIME
Criminal offenses can be broken up into three categories: common
law crimes, unlawful unilateral or coordinated business conduct,
and unlawful market exchanges. The common law crimes consist of
the familiar subjects of criminal law: murder, rape, battery, and rob-
bery.90 The second category, consisting of unlawful business conduct,
is exemplified by the Sherman Act, which prohibits price-fixing
cartels and monopolistic conduct.91 However, criminal prosecutions
under the Sherman Act have been limited to price-fixing cartels.92
The third category consists of market exchanges that the state
prohibits, such as usurious transactions,93 sales of illegal drugs,94
sales of renewable tissue and organs,95 and prostitution.96
90. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 176-219.
91. Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012). 
92. See Criminal Program Update 2015, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/
division-update/2015/criminal-program-update [https://perma.cc/S5CL-24MK].
93. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 86 (2012) (providing that the entire interest is forfeited in the
event that the interest rate exceeds the limits outlined in section 85 of the title); MASS GEN.
LAWS ch. 271, § 49(a) (2017) (prohibiting the charging, taking, or receiving of more than 20
percent of the loan in interest and fees in exchange for a loan); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.45
(McKinney 2017) (prohibiting the knowing possession of usurious loan records); 18 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4806.3 (West 2017) (prohibiting as a felony engaging or conspiring
to commit criminal usury). 
94. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) (prohibiting drug trafficking); id. § 844(a)
(prohibiting drug possession within federal jurisdictions); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401
(2017) (prohibiting the manufacturing or delivering of a controlled substance); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 94C, § 32E (2017) (prohibiting the trafficking of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, mor-
phine, and opium); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.43 (McKinney 2017) (prohibiting as a first-degree
felony the knowing and unlawful distribution of two ounces or more of controlled substances).
95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012) (prohibiting the sale of human organs in interstate
commerce); CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(a) (West 2017) (prohibiting the sale of human organs);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-160(a) (2017) (prohibiting the sale of human body parts as a felony);
IND. CODE § 35-46-5-1 (2017) (prohibiting the sale of human organs, including the “kidney,
liver, heart, lung, cornea, eye, bone marrow, bone, pancreas, or skin,” as a felony); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 113A, § 16(a) (2017) (prohibiting the sale of body parts). 
96. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012) (prohibiting the transportation of individuals within
interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to engage in prostitution); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 272, § 53A(a) (2017) (prohibiting engaging in sexual conduct with another for a fee); 18 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5902(a) (West 2017) (prohibiting persons from engaging in
sexual activity as a business or otherwise loitering in public view to be hired for sexual
purposes); TENN. CODE § 39-13-513(b)(1) (2017) (prohibiting engaging in prostitution as a
Class B misdemeanor).
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The alternative to criminal law enforcement is private enforce-
ment through the tort system. A decision on the scope of criminal
law is in essence a decision on the boundary between criminal law
and tort law. To define this boundary one must first isolate the
features that distinguish criminal law from tort law. There are two
essential distinctions that I will recognize in this framework. The
first is that criminal law generally seeks to completely deter or pro-
hibit, while tort law seeks primarily to internalize harms.97 These
are default positions, to be sure; criminal law in some special appli-
cations seeks to internalize harms (criminal fines for price fixing),98
while tort law in special applications aims to completely deter
(punitive damages).99 The second essential distinction is that crim-
inal law assumes the involvement of public enforcement agents, at
least at the apprehension stage of enforcement, while tort law
operates largely through private enforcement efforts.
Punishment, like the scope of the law, can be broken down into
general categories. The most general division is between prison sen-
tences and monetary penalties. The category of monetary penalties
can be broken down further into monetary penalties imposed by the
state and private damages awards given to plaintiffs. For simplicity,
I will say there are three main types of punishment: prison sen-
tences, fines, and damages to victims. In theory, at least, exposure
of a crime is a separate punishment by itself. If a government in-
vestigates and determines that an individual or firm committed a
crime, the naming and public identification of the offender may be
considered a form of punishment to the extent that it harms rep-
utation and exposes the offender to retaliation and private law-
suits.100
97. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of internalization and antitrust penalties, see KEITH N. HYLTON,
ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 43-52 (2003). 
99. On punitive damages and prohibition, see David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney &
Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1990); and Hylton, supra note 17, at 439-40.
100. See, e.g., Michael L. Denger & D. Jarrett Arp, Criminal and Civil Cartel Victim Com-
pensation: Does Our Multifaceted Enforcement System Promote Sound Competition Policy?,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 41, 42-43 (outlining various civil “follow-on” actions against
criminal antitrust violators); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar
Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365,
368-72 (1999) (proposing the inclusion of public shaming as a punishment to white-collar
crimes due to the associated reputational harm).
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A narrow criminal punishment system would limit the scope of
criminal prohibitions to just the common law crimes, and limit the
harshest punishment, prison sentences, to the same category. The
broadest criminal punishment system would criminalize activities
in all three categories of offense and impose prison sentences as the
presumptive punishment across the board. Several variations exist
between these two poles. How should one choose the right variation
of both the scope of criminal prohibitions and the harshness of
punishment?
Consider, for example, the optimal scope of criminal prohibitions.
As the scope broadens from the first category (common law crimes)
to the third category (market activities), the factors that encourage
rent-seeking are more likely to be observed. The gap between pun-
ishment stakes and the compensation of enforcers widens.101 In
addition, the degree of discretion exercised by enforcers generally
increases as the scope broadens from the first to the third
category.102 This implies that the cost of criminal law enforcement
generally increases, because of rent-seeking, as the scope
increases—again, expanding beyond common law crimes outward
to incorporate market activity. Given this increase in cost, the
benefit to society from enforcement must increase at a faster rate to
justify the expansion in scope on social welfare grounds.
IV. THE CASE FOR LIMITING THE SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LAW
Taking the first category (common law crimes) as the most basic,
the scope of prohibitions could range from category one (common
law crimes), to categories “one plus two” (common law crimes plus
business activities), to categories “one plus two plus three” (common
law crimes plus business activities plus market exchanges). This
framework implicitly rules out the possibility of a regime in which
category three actions (market exchanges) were unlawful while
category one actions (for example, murder) were lawful. Although
such a regime is suggested as possible in this framework, it would
both violate the basic premises of the Classical and Neoclassical
punishment models and be inconsistent with any of the legal
101. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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systems ever observed.103 Most legal systems start with prohibitions
of the most harmful crimes and gradually expand to prohibit a
broader range of potentially harmful conduct.104
I will take it as given that the criminal law should and will con-
tinue to apply to the standard common law crimes (category one).
The policy reasons for adopting this position are suggested by the
theory surveyed earlier in this Article.105 These are crimes that can
be viewed as efforts to bypass markets (or consensual exchange),
and the law should generally seek to eliminate the prospect of gain
from such behavior. As technology changes, the specific actions
falling under the category of common law crimes will naturally ex-
pand to include modern variations of ancient crimes, such as cyber-
theft.106
I contend that the boundary of criminal law should end with the
category of common law crimes and their modern variants. The
general presumption should be that criminal law does not extend to
market exchanges, such as consensual adult prostitution, or to
unlawful commercial conduct, such as price fixing, unrelated to the
basic set of common law crimes.
A. Markets and Criminal Law
First, consider the space of market exchanges. Criminal law
should be ousted from this space. To be clear, this means that the
state should not apply its criminal prohibitions to voluntary market
exchanges between rational adults, such as prostitution, usury, or
drug transactions.107 This is not to say that no law should operate at
103. See supra notes 30-33, 54 and accompanying text.
104. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2-4 (1881).
105. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (prohibiting fraudulent schemes to obtain money or
property through the use of wire, radio, or television transmissions in interstate or foreign
commerce); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(1)(d) (2017) (defining as a computer crime accessing
any computer, computer network, or computer system with the intent to commit a theft); OR.
REV. STAT. § 164.377(2)(c) (2017) (prohibiting computer crimes, including theft via use of a
computer, computer system, or computer network); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7611(a)(1) (West 2017) (defining the offense of unlawful use of a computer as accessing “any
computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, computer program,
computer database, World Wide Web site or telecommunication device” with the intent to
defraud). 
107. Obviously, this argument does not apply to market exchanges that do not exclusively
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all;108 tort law, for example, should continue to regulate such activ-
ities. But as a general rule, criminal law should not prohibit market
exchanges.
Why? Consider the sale of an item by a seller to a willing
buyer—for example, the sale of marijuana. If we view the seller as
the violator of the law, then the basis for completely deterring his
conduct, following the Classical model, is difficult to find. In the
typical common law crime (for example, robbery), the offender takes
an action that harms the victim. The seller of marijuana, however,
takes no action that harms his purchaser; indeed, he satisfies a
desire of the purchaser. Of course the purchaser pays for the mari-
juana, and perhaps that can be considered the harm suffered. But
the purchaser pays only because the benefit he perceives from
consumption is greater than the price he pays, so his ultimate per-
ception is that he gains on net from the transaction. Because there
is no net harm imposed on the purchaser, there is no utilitarian
basis for completely deterring the seller’s conduct.
One might argue that the harm to the victim can be found in the
victim’s failure to realize the harm he imposes on himself by
consuming marijuana. This self-imposed harm theory assumes that
the purchaser fails to correctly perceive his own utility, and whether
it has improved or deteriorated after consumption of marijuana.
consist of rational adults, such as child prostitution. Criminal prohibition should continue to
apply to such transactions on the ground that at least one of the parties is unable to be a
competent party to the contract. The purchaser who takes advantage of a party who is in-
competent to form a contract can be subjected to criminal punishment under this policy.
108. What if the participants in a criminalized market prefer that the market remain
criminalized? For example, if the participants, through bribery, have made suitable arrange-
ments with enforcement agents, they may prefer that the market remain criminalized. How-
ever, this is unpersuasive as an argument for criminalization, because it is little more than
a rationalization for regulating entry to uphold the prices of incumbent suppliers. One case
that may seem to provide a counterargument is the decriminalization of prostitution in Zim-
babwe in 2016. See Why Some Prostitutes Would Rather Their Jobs Were Illegal: Decrimin-
alising the Sex Trade in Zimbabwe, ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.economist.com/
news/middle-east-and-africa/21713866-less-stigma-more-competition-decriminalising-sex-
trade-zimbabwe [https://perma.cc/27MK-WHFW]. Older prostitutes complained that the
market was flooded after decriminalization by younger prostitutes who drove prices down to
extremely low levels. See id. However, this appears to be an unusual case reflecting the ex-
treme poverty resulting from the mismanagement of Zimbabwe’s economy by Robert Mugabe,
driving many young women into the market for prostitution. See id. The Zimbabwe example
also reflects a failure to appropriately regulate the decriminalized prostitution market—for
example, by requiring registration or taking other steps to prevent coercion.
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However, if this is a valid basis for treating the sale of marijuana as
an imposition of harm by the seller on the purchaser, then the same
basis can be relied on to treat the sale of many other products or
services as a net harm to the purchaser. Under the same theory,
individuals who sell fatty foods directly to consumers, or foods with
a high sugar content, could be convicted under the criminal law and
imprisoned.
Further, prohibiting a market on the theory that consumers in
the market impose harm on themselves fails to consider the harms
that would result from prohibition. Prohibiting a market does not
make the market disappear. Transactions continue, hidden from
public view.109 Underground markets are likely to result in much
greater harms suffered by purchasers than would open markets
capable of being regulated and governed by legal rules. Under-
ground drug markets are more likely to include contaminated
products.110 Similarly, criminalized sex markets are more likely to
involve coercion.111
Another argument for treating the sale of marijuana as a harm
imposed by the seller would point to externalities, that is, harms
that fall on third parties. The marijuana user is likely to work less
effectively,112 or to drive under the influence—all activities that may
109. Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of
Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1314-19 (summarizing the various estimates of the size
of the illegal black market for cocaine).
110. See, e.g., Dangers Caused by the Prohibition Law, UKCIA, http://www.ukcia.org/
culture/effects/law2.php [https://perma.cc/D4WF-LCVZ] (“Perhaps one of the greatest dangers
posed by prohibition is the uncertain nature of the commercial supply. Most cannabis in the
UK is supplied by a massive and unregulated industry.”).
111. See Scott Cunningham & Manisha Shah, Decriminalizing Indoor Prostitution: Imp-
lications for Sexual Violence and Public Health 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 20281, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20281.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUY6-
SHK2] (“Not surprisingly, we find that decriminalization increased the size of the indoor
market. However, we also find that decriminalization caused both forcible rape offenses and
gonorrhea incidence to decline for the overall population. Our synthetic control model finds
824 fewer reported rape offenses (31 percent decrease) and 1,035 fewer cases of female gon-
orrhea (39 percent decrease) from 2004 to 2009.”).
112. See, e.g., Roxanne Khamsi, How Safe Is Recreational Marijuana?, SCI. AM. (June 1,
2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-safe-recreational-marijuana/ [https://
perma.cc/B3S8-N6FW] (“Marijuana also temporarily impairs an array of mental abilities,
especially memory and attention. Dozens of studies have shown, for example, that people
under the influence of marijuana perform worse on tests of working memory, which is the
ability to temporarily hold and manipulate information in one’s mind. Participants in these
studies have greater difficulty remembering and reciting short lists of numerals and random
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impose a risk of harm on others.113 This argument, like the preced-
ing one, has a nearly unlimited scope of application. One could
argue, for example, that a person who enters into a consensual am-
orous relationship with another may be so distracted and absorbed
by infatuation that he is unable to work productively, or to compe-
tently manage an automobile on the roads. By the same reasoning,
one could impose a criminal prohibition on all amorous relation-
ships. As for the evidence, there is little to suggest that marijuana
imposes an unusual risk on users or third parties compared to legal
and potentially harmful substances such as alcohol.114
Admittedly, there is some degree of external harm that might
justify criminal prohibition of a market. But this should be observ-
ed only under rare conditions. In the vast majority of cases, it
should be sufficient to apply the criminal prohibition directly to the
conduct that generates injury. For example, consider a drug that
causes consumers to commit acts of violence. It should be possible,
in most cases, to provide a sufficient deterrent by punishing of-
fenders for committing the violent acts, rather than punishing the
consumption of the drug. Punishing consumers for the mere act of
consuming the drug would be a justifiable preemptive policy only if
consumption of the drug led consumers to immediately commit vi-
olent acts without any process of decision-making on their parts,
and consumers were unable to determine in advance that the drug
would have such an effect. However, if consumers could determine
words. Research has further revealed that cannabis blunts concentration, weakens motor
coordination and interferes with the ability to quickly scan one’s surroundings for obstacles.”).
113. See id. (“In driving-simulation and closed-course studies, people on marijuana are
slower to hit the brakes and worse at safely changing lanes. Investigators still debate, how-
ever, at what point these impairments translate to more traffic accidents.”).
114. On the harm of marijuana compared to the harm of alcohol, see Ruth Weissenborn &
David J. Nutt, Popular Intoxicants: What Lessons Can Be Learned from the Last 40 Years of
Alcohol and Cannabis Regulation?, 26 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 213, 218 (2012) (concluding
that a “direct comparison of alcohol and cannabis showed that alcohol was considered to be
more than twice as harmful as cannabis to [individual] users, and five times as harmful as
cannabis to others”). In addition, a 2009 review published in a mental health and addictions
journal estimated that health-related costs per user are over eight times higher for drinkers
of alcoholic beverages than they are for those who use cannabis, and are forty times higher
for tobacco smokers. Gerald Thomas & Chris Davis, Cannabis, Tobacco and Alcohol Use in
Canada: Comparing Risks of Harm and Costs to Society, 5 VISIONS, no. 4, 2009, at 11, 13 (“In
terms of [health-related] costs per user: tobacco-related health costs are over $800 per user,
alcohol-related health costs are much lower at $165 per user, and cannabis-related health
costs are the lowest at $20 per user.”). 
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in advance that the drug would cause them to commit violent acts,
then imposing sufficient penalties for commission of the acts, when
under the influence of the drug, would deter either consumption of
the drug or the commission of violent acts after consumption. The
instances in which it would be necessary for deterrence purposes to
punish consumers for the mere act of consumption should be ex-
tremely rare.
Nothing in this argument suggests that it would be undesirable
for the state to impose harsher penalties on harmful acts committed
under the influence of drugs. Indeed, it may be desirable to do so,
provided that the harmful act, rather than the mere consumption of
the drug, triggers the penalty. In the cases in which the drug im-
pairs the consumer’s ability to think rationally or to discern right
from wrong after consumption, it may be advisable for deterrence
purposes to increase the penalty for commission of crimes under the
influence to induce the consumer to take the penalty into account in
the period of full rationality before consuming the drug. Any specific
level of deterrence of harmful acts associated with the consumption
of a drug should be achievable by punishing the harmful acts them-
selves rather than the consumption of the drug. The punishment
geared to violent acts alters the terms of trade in a manner that
would discourage the violence-prone from consuming the drug with-
out affecting the consumption incentives of the nonviolent. Indeed,
imposing a penalty on consumption rather than the harmful act
could perversely increase the frequency of harmful acts if the vio-
lence-prone are prevalent among the consumers with the greatest
demand for the drug.
Now consider the purchaser of marijuana as the violator of the
law. The only basis for prohibiting the simple act of purchase (or
consumption) would be the belief that the purchaser is hurting him-
self unknowingly—as if the purchaser had acquired poison falsely
labeled as a painkiller. However, there is no basis within the util-
itarian punishment framework for using the criminal laws to punish
someone for unknowingly hurting himself. The Neoclassical model
of punishment requires a division between areas of activity in which
harms are generated as an unintentional byproduct of legitimate
activities and areas of activity in which crimes result from the
2540 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2513
intentional imposition of harm.115 A buyer of marijuana, however,
in no sense intentionally imposes harm on anyone; any harm he
imposes by the mere act of purchase or consumption would be on
himself alone, and unintentional. Under the rationale that such un-
knowing infliction of self-harm could justify criminal punishment,
the state could as easily punish people who purchase and consume
too much butter or drink too much soda.
As noted earlier, the process of apprehension and punishment
forms a secondary basis for limiting the use of criminal law.
Criminal enforcement often involves preemptive efforts, such as
surveillance, and harsh methods of apprehension.116 However, if the
activity is one that enhances welfare generally, such preemptive
effort and accompanying intrusive enforcement methods would be
undesirable. The goal of preemption itself is undesirable in this
context, so the enforcement methods associated with preemption
would also be undesirable.
B. Public Choice and Scope Considerations
In addition to the generally weak basis for deterrence in the case
of a consensual market transaction, the case for criminal prohibition
is further weakened, if not entirely vitiated, by the public choice
issues generated by criminal enforcement in this context. To enforce
a prohibition against market transactions, such as marijuana sales,
law enforcement agents must be prepared to intervene in the trans-
action between a willing buyer and seller, and proceed to apprehend
and punish one or both of the parties. If the parties are aware of
this, they will attempt to arrange their transaction away from the
watchful eye of the enforcement agent. If the enforcement agent
merely stands in the public square and looks for transactions, he
will never see any, because individuals will arrange their transac-
tions in private venues away from public view.
Recognizing that transactions will take place in privacy, the state,
to enforce the criminal law, will demand the right to pierce the
private sphere to observe potentially unlawful transactions and to
find violations of the law. This effort immediately puts the state at
115. See supra Part I.
116. See supra Part I.
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odds with the individual and sacrifices autonomy, privacy, freedom
of association, and other desirable traits of a relatively free and
open society to the enforcement goals of criminal prohibition. To
enforce the law, the state will have to monitor the private conduct
of individuals, listen in on their private conversations, and follow
them into their private meeting spaces. Such surveillance may be
justifiable under certain conditions, but it should be viewed as an
evil that must be embraced only to prevent a much greater evil from
occurring. However, the rather negligible evil associated with the
consumption of substances such as marijuana is insufficient to jus-
tify the surveillance of individuals.
To the extent that profiling based on data is an especially efficient
form of surveillance, this argument applies just as well to such
actuarial methods of surveillance.117 There is no reason to believe
that surveillance is inherently harmful to social welfare. The
relevant inquiry is whether the benefits of surveillance justify its
costs to society, and that will depend on its purpose (as well as ef-
fects) in particular instances. In many market exchange settings,
the benefits of surveillance—whether through direct observation or
through profiling based on data—will not justify the costs.118
117. For a critique of the use of profiling in enforcement, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT,
AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 122-25
(2007). 
118. Although not central to this analysis, the effects of profiling or selective enforcement
may not be beneficial. A policy of targeting a specific subpopulation for enforcement could
generate a “substitution effect” by reducing the perceived penalty to the nontargeted pop-
ulation. The same policy might also have an undesirable scale effect by imposing a risk of
punishment on all members of the targeted group. See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at
81 (using A to refer to the advantaged—for example, white—group and B to refer to the dis-
advantaged or targeted group, the authors argue: “Now, in our scenario, group A members are
under-deterred because they are facing low expected sanctions for engaging in undesirable
activities. The deterrent effect on group B members would also be reduced because they are
now punished whether they have been ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ In other words, the incentive to comply
with the law is reduced for group B members because the payoffs from compliance and
noncompliance have gotten closer.” (footnotes omitted)). For a similar argument, see Bernard
E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and
Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275,
1282 (2004) (arguing that targeting blacks might make whites less fearful of punishment for
violating the law, generating more crime); and Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, Target-
ing the Majority: Redesigning Racial Profiling, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 318 (2006). At
present, there are no empirical articles demonstrating the hypothesized substitution effect
in actual law enforcement settings. However, some experimental social science research
suggests such an effect could exist. See Amy A. Hackney & Jack Glaser, Reverse Deterrence
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Moreover, surveillance itself is necessarily a discretionary activity
of enforcers. This is so because enforcement agents cannot monitor
everyone. Unless the state adopts a blanket policy of surveillance,
law enforcers will have to choose to monitor some individuals and
not others. These decisions will inevitably be political in nature,
leading to charges of bias and unfairness. Willing transactions be-
tween buyers and sellers are likely to take place in almost every
community of the state. Enforcers, however, might be reluctant to
aggressively pursue potential violations within their own communi-
ties because of the ostracism such action might bring. Once the
decision to monitor is viewed as at least partly political, the po-
tential for the unequal treatment and abuse of potential offenders
becomes clear.
If the state were to avoid the unfairness charge by monitoring
everyone, then matters could be much worse—as Edward Snowden
famously intimated after revealing U.S. government surveillance
methods and then fleeing to Moscow.119 A state that monitors every-
one gathers up evidence that can be used to charge almost anyone
with a violation of the law, or at least a violation of the public’s
expectations of honest and upstanding conduct. For example, even
the most diligent employees sometimes loaf off on the job. A sur-
veillance system that gathered all such evidence would put everyone
at risk of punishment or at least public embarrassment. Enforce-
ment agents would then be in a position to demand bribes from
individuals to avoid punishment or public shame, or to arbitrarily
punish.120
In addition to the risks associated with unchecked enforcement
discretion, the danger of imposing criminal law on market transac-
tions such as the sale of marijuana is that the punishment stakes
will increase with the demand on the market. If the product is
in Racial Profiling: Increased Transgressions by Nonprofiled Whites, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
348, 350-51 (2013) (detailing an experiment with students suggesting the reverse deterrence
effect of racially targeted monitoring).
119. See Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations, Says His
Mission’s Accomplished, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-
accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html?utm_term=.
71224ecb3e98 [https://perma.cc/H5AR-KG6H].
120. The same critique can be offered of a “random profiling” or random surveillance
method. For such a proposal, see HARCOURT, supra note 117, at 237-39.
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highly desirable, then purchasers will offer large sums for the prod-
uct, and the bids for the product will be large enough to cover the
cost of compromising enforcement agents. As the market value of
the banned substance increases, the level of corruption within the
enforcement body will tend to increase too. Outsiders may view en-
forcement agents as corrupt, or backward, when in fact, they have
been put to a task that is almost rationally infeasible.
Ready examples of the disabling effect of corruption on law en-
forcement are observed in foreign countries. Law enforcement in
Mexico is seriously weakened by corruption induced by the illegal
markets for drugs—both in the market there and in the United
States. A recent report suggests that half a dozen of the country’s
thirty-one states have become “ungovernable” because of organized
crime connected to the drug trade.121 In September 2014, forty-three
student teachers were killed, presumably by members of drug
gangs; reports suggest that the students were handed over to the
gangs by local police officers.122 In July 2015, a drug gang chief, El
Chapo, rode out of a maximum-security Mexican prison on a motor-
cycle through an illuminated, ventilated, mile-long tunnel dug from
under his cell.123 Roughly 75 percent of murders in Mexico go un-
solved, while at the same time 90 percent of convictions are based
on confessions, many procured through beatings and torture.124
The general picture of criminal law enforcement in Mexico con-
firms some of the most ominous predictions of the public choice
model of criminal law. Enforcement agents often work at the behest
of criminal gangs and shift blame away from gang members to
innocent individuals. As a consequence, the deterrent value of law
enforcement has been compromised. Murders go unsolved, while
121. See Bello: Ciudad Juárez Trembles Again, ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.
economist.com/news/americas/21709362-mexican-security-success-story-faces-new-test-
ciudad-ju-rez-trembles-again [https://perma.cc/PJ5F-N3RG].
122. See Tracy Wilkinson, New Report Raises Chilling Possibility that Mystery of 43
Mexican Students’ Disappearance Will Never Be Solved, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016, 6:00 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-students-20160425-story.html
[https://perma.cc/4BNG-DUVH].
123. See Mexican Drug Lord’s Brazen Tunnel Escape, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/
pictures/drug-lord-joaquin-el-chapos-prison-tunnel-escape/ [https://perma.cc/8DLH-22ZH]
(displaying numerous pictures of “El Chapo’s” elaborate escape tunnel).
124. See Criminal Justice in Mexico: Trials and Errors, ECONOMIST (June 18, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21700682-right-reform-has-been-introduced-
perfecting-it-could-take-years-trials-and-errors [https://perma.cc/JR3S-8CNC].
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innocents are accused of committing them. Chiefs of drug gangs do
not go to prison, or they leave prison on their own terms at a time
of their choosing. Individuals who upset powerful gangs can be
served up to them, for torture or murder, by the police.
One important feature of Mexican law enforcement is the enor-
mous gap between the punishment stakes and the compensation of
enforcers. The average pay of Mexican police officers is $350 per
month.125 The drug market is a hugely valuable business largely
driven by demand of consumers in the United States. The Mexican
state is no match on economic grounds for the powerful market
forces on the side of the drug gangs. These market forces have
penetrated the criminal law enforcement process at all levels in
Mexico.126
Law enforcement agents receive higher wages in the United
States ($61,240 per year)127 than in Mexico, and thus the differential
between punishment stakes and enforcer compensation is not as
wide in the United States as in Mexico. Still, the same corruption
issues inherent to any system that attempts to use the criminal law
enforcement process to suppress a market are observed in the Unit-
ed States. These issues sit in the background of a controversial
study of police enforcement in America that concluded that efforts
to racially diversify police forces led to more crime.128 The connec-
tion between crime and racial diversity asserted by the author, John
Lott, was a causal one in which racial diversification reduced the
125. See Organised Crime in Mexico: Under the Volcano, ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2010), http://
www.economist.com/node/17249102 [https://perma.cc/Y9WA-N8ZM].
126. For an illuminating account, see Mexico Corruption Report, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUP-
TION PORTAL, http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/mexico [https://perma.
cc/3LRK-R7QT] (“Corruption is a significant risk for companies operating in Mexico. Bribery
is widespread in the country’s judiciary and police, and business registration processes,
including getting construction permits and licenses, are negatively influenced by corruption.”);
and Mexican Police v. U.S. Police, COPBLOCK (Nov. 5, 2011), https://www.copblock.org/9835/
mexican-police-vs-u-s-police/ [https://perma.cc/NGZ4-MXWW] (“The one thing that all the cops
and soldiers have in common is that they are corrupt to one degree or another. Many are
bought and paid for by the cartels. In some cases, the entire police force is in the pocket of the
cartel.”). 
127. On average police pay in the United States, see Financial Stability and Benefits,
DISCOVERPOLICING.ORG, http://discoverpolicing.org/why_policing/?fa=financial_stability
[https://perma.cc/D95B-K9GS].
128. See John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others at Risk? Affirmative Action,
Police Departments, and Crime, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 239, 248-49 (2000).
2018] RATIONAL INCENTIVES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2545
quality of the police force, which in turn led to more crime.129 The
precise mechanism behind this causal relationship is not stated
clearly in Lott’s article. Moreover, although Lott’s regression an-
alysis attempts to control for the reverse causality problem130—that
is, that attempts to racially diversify police departments may be
caused by crime rather than being a cause of crime—one cannot be
sure that the causation problem was adequately addressed. Putting
the causation question aside, the mechanism suggested by the study
is that a police officer who could not add a series of numbers as
quickly as another would be more likely to excuse criminal conduct
or fail to recognize violations of the law. However, Lott’s regression
analysis does not directly draw on test score data, relying instead on
measures of the percentage of police officers identified as minorities
as independent variables.131
The public choice perspective provides an alternative explana-
tion for Lott’s results, and one that does not tend toward racism.
In urban areas with large minority populations, new officers hired
to racially diversify the police force would be directly drawn from
the populations where much of the criminal activity takes place.
These new, relatively low-wage recruits would be especially vul-
nerable to bribes from criminal gangs operating in the same areas,
just as the local Mexican police officers appear to be now. They
would sometimes have connections of family and friendship with
members of the drug gangs. As a result, the new officers would tend
to be more vulnerable to corruption, because of their relatively low
compensation and social connections among the population of of-
fenders. In addition, the new officers would tend to have better in-
formation on the actual risk associated with a particular criminal
suspect and the potentially negative consequences of incarceration,
factors that might lead to a more conservative approach to enforce-
ment. These incentives could easily generate the patterns in the
data reported by Lott, without having any relationship with the in-
tellectual competence of the new officers. Indeed, from this perspec-
tive one might find, among the recruits, an inverse relationship
between measured cognitive skills and reluctance to accept a bribe
129. See id. at 271.
130. See id. at 247-48.
131. See id. at 256 tbl.VI.
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to forgo taking enforcement action when the costs of such action
would exceed the benefits.
In addition to private efforts to avoid enforcement leading in
turn to greater surveillance by the state, applying criminal law to
market activities induces market participants to resort to coercive
force. One reason is because the criminalization of market activity
induces participants, unable to enforce their agreements by legal
means, to use force to administer agreements.132 The same actors
may use force to protect their markets from entry by rivals.133 Spe-
cialization in the use of force becomes an important skill that will
be demanded by participants in other illegal activities, too. Over
time, drug markets become populated with individuals who are
especially suited to the use of force.134 Through this process, crim-
inalization produces the very violence that generates calls for
continued criminalization.135 Unsurprisingly, expansions of illegal
drugs markets are associated with rising crime,136 but this is be-
cause of a reverse causation process in which the criminalization of
drugs markets induces criminal involvement, which in turn gen-
erates crime.137 In Detroit, murders grew quickly as the city’s heroin
market expanded in the 1970s.138 But this is probably not because
heroin makes people murderous or especially violent; indeed heroin
is categorized as a depressant.139 The penetration and expansion of
132. See Daniel Flores, Violence and Law Enforcement in Markets for Illegal Goods, 48
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 77, 78 (2016) (“Similarly, Burrus (1999) says that drug dealers engage
in violent activities for the following reasons: to protect themselves against theft because they
carry drugs and cash; to convince their clients to pay their debts; and mainly to gain larger
market shares.”).
133. See id.
134. See Wisotsky, supra note 109, at 1404.
135. See id. at 1307-08.
136. See Damien Gayle, Illegal Drug Market Is Booming, Says UN Watchdog, GUARDIAN
(June 22, 2017, 11:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jun/22/illegal-drug-
market-heroin-cocaine-is-booming-says-un-watchdog [https://perma.cc/789P-QPDW].
137. See Wisotsky, supra note 109, at 1307-08 (arguing that increased law enforcement
“creates lucrative entrepreneurial opportunities” in drug markets, which in turn “promotes
and finances murder, theft, organized crime, tax evasion, corruption of public officials,” and
more).
138. See, e.g., Agis Salpukas, 7 Slain in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1971), http://www.ny
times.com/1971/06/15/archives/7-slain-in-detroit-drug-link-suspected-7-young-people-slain-
in.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ZH4C-X3BK].
139. See, e.g., Heroin, ALCOHOL & DRUG FOUND., https://adf.org.au/drug-facts/heroin/ [https:
//perma.cc/BFH3-AT6E].
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the market for heroin brought in criminal gangs that specialized in
the use of force to protect markets and enforce agreements.140 Those
same gangs used bribery and infiltration to hobble the Detroit po-
lice force.141
Some have maintained that ousting criminal law from the mar-
ket for marijuana would not be without significant costs. Marijuana
has been called a gateway to more harmful drugs.142 However, the
record on legalization has not supported this long-standing critique
of legalization. For example, in 2001, Portugal decriminalized the
possession of all drugs for personal use.143 At present, lifetime
marijuana use is lower in Portugal than in the European Union
generally, and the use of other drugs (illicit in other countries) has
fallen.144 The rate of HIV infection from the use of infected needles
has plummeted in Portugal.145 While Portugal may not be represen-
tative of every country that chooses to oust criminal law from the
market for marijuana, it stands as evidence that decriminalization
does not necessarily lead to greater or more harmful use, or greater
costs associated with such use. In the United States, the recent
wave of state level decriminalization reforms146 have not been
followed by a general increase in marijuana use, and recent data
show a decline among young teens.147 An empirical examination of
140. See, e.g., Timothy S. Bynum & Sean P. Varano, The Anti-Gang Initiative in Detroit:
An Aggressive Enforcement Approach to Gangs, in POLICING GANGS AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 217
(Scott H. Decker ed., 2003); Thomas Mieczkowski, Geeking up and Throwing down: Heroin
Street Life in Detroit, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 645, 659-60 (1986).
141. See Thomas Michael Mieczkowski, Street Selling Heroin: The Young Boys Technique
in a Detroit Neighborhood 17 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State Univer-
sity) (on file with author).
142. See Is Marijuana a Gateway Drug?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drug
abuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/marijuana-gateway-drug [https://perma.
cc/EL48-GTQC].
143. See Drugs in Europe: Not Mind-Stretching Enough, ECONOMIST (June 18, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21700648-liberal-drug-policies-have-spread-across-
europe-some-early-adopters-are-slipping-behind-not [https://perma.cc/JJC8-FQFR].
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. On decriminalization of marijuana in the United States, see States That Have Decrim-
inalized, NORML, http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-have-decriminalized
[https://perma.cc/C5CJ-558P] (listing the states that have decriminalized marijuana in the
United States).
147. See Teen Substance Use Shows Promising Decline, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Dec.
13, 2016), https://www.drugabuse.gov/news-events/news-releases/2016/12/teen-substance-use-
shows-promising-decline [https://perma.cc/QV2X-QYQ6]. 
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the effect of state marijuana legalizations taking effect in 2012 and
2014 (in Colorado, Washington, Alaska, and Oregon) finds no evi-
dence of a significant impact on drug use, crime, traffic safety, teen
educational achievement, or public health.148
C. Business Conduct
What about unfair or potentially harmful business conduct, such
as price fixing or monopolization? The Sherman Act authorizes
courts to imprison violators for up to ten years.149 In practice, anti-
trust enforcers pursue prison sentences only for price fixers, and
convicted price fixers serve roughly two years in prison.150
First, consider the case for punishment under the Classical and
Neoclassical deterrence models. Under the Classical model, the pur-
pose of punishment is to completely deter.151 To completely deter the
price fixer, the state would have to eliminate all of the profits from
price fixing.152 This would be an efficient policy if the price fixer’s
conduct includes no economically efficient features. Because of the
possibility that it could, Becker recommended an approach that in-
ternalizes the losses from price fixing. Under Becker’s approach,
price fixers should be completely deterred when and only when their
conduct included no efficient features.153 It is important to note that
the policy under consideration is to deter price fixing, not selling in
general. The previous example, which considered drug transactions,
involved a policy to shutter an entire market.
Although price fixing without any efficient features reduces so-
ciety’s welfare, some price fixing may include efficient features. For
example, a group of firms might share an efficient technological
process, but only if there is an agreement not to engage in fierce
price cutting. The decision to share the technology would enable
148. See generally Angela Dills et al., Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana
Legalizations, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 16, 2016, at 5.
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
150. See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 92. 
151. See, e.g., BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 42.
152. See Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, 100
IOWA L. REV. 2069, 2071 (2015) (“The normative implication of these propositions is that
penalties against the firm sufficient to eliminate the incentive to fix prices are necessary in
order to deter price fixing.”).
153. See Becker, supra note 7, at 198-99.
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differentiated firms to survive and continue to provide a variety of
products to the market. James Duke’s “Tobacco Trust” was formed
in precisely this fashion: Duke used a technological innovation in
cigarette production to force prices down, and then compelled rivals
to join his cartel based on the same production model.154
Given the possibility of efficient price fixing, and especially given
that the broader crime of monopolization often includes efficient
features (consider, for example, Microsoft’s technological integration
of Internet Explorer with its operating system),155 the case in anti-
trust for criminal prohibition rather than internalization through
private lawsuits is weak. Antitrust enforcement should fall under
the tort regime, not the criminal justice system.
Even in the likely majority case of inefficient price fixing, the
case for criminal prohibition is weak. The Classical model recom-
mends complete deterrence of acts that harm victims, which are
takings of a sort.156 In the price-fixing context, the purchaser is not
harmed on net by the transaction. The purchaser gains on net from
the transaction, but just not as much as he would have gained in a
competitive market. The reason price fixing is inefficient is not
because of the component of harm suffered by purchasers—a com-
ponent that is smaller than the purchaser’s gross gain—but because
of the potential gain some potential consumers could have received
had the price been set at the competitive level. In other words, price
fixing is inefficient or reduces social welfare only because it denies
some potential consumers a benefit that they would have received
under a counterfactual hypothetical world of perfect competition.
We have no way of determining the identities of these denied ben-
eficiaries. The arguments here are illustrated in the diagram below,
which shows the position of consumers and potential consumers (the
individuals who would have purchased the good if the price had not
been fixed above the competitive level, that is, fixed at PF rather
than set at the competitive level PC). The area labeled “net gain”
154. See ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSIS-
TENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 26-29, 33-34 (2007). 
155. See Windows 8 Integration, MICROSOFT, https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
hh781490(v=vs.85).aspx [https://perma.cc/LQ5X-KJ2Q] (listing the various benefits of “the
tight integration of Windows 8 and Internet Explorer 10,” including flip ahead browsing, link
previews, and streaming media with Play To).
156. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 49, at 1195-98.
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shows the net welfare of the consumers, which is positive. The area
labeled “benefit denied” shows the forgone gain to potential con-
sumers. Because the activity of the price fixer does not impose a net
harm on consumers, it should not be prohibited through the crim-
inal laws. The proper model is internalization of harm through
private liability.
Figure 1. Society’s Welfare and Price Fixing
The case for prohibiting price fixing is noticeably different from the
reason we prohibit robbery. Robbery is undesirable because it clear-
ly imposes a substantial net harm on the victim relative to the hy-
pothetical world in which he was not robbed, and we have no trouble
identifying the victim; we consider the same individual in both the
real (robbed) and counterfactual (not robbed) scenarios. In the price-
fixing case, no consumer suffers a net harm; that is, no consumer is
in a worse off position than in the counterfactual in which he did not
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enter into the transaction. Price fixing is prohibited only because of
the potential gain denied to a class of unidentifiable potential con-
sumers. But to deny someone an unpromised gain is not the same
thing as imposing a direct harm on him.
One could argue that the consumer who purchases from the price
fixer is in a worse off position relative to the counterfactual in which
the price fixer lowers his price to the competitive level. By the same
reasoning, one could argue that the consumer is in a worse off
position relative to the counterfactual consumer who purchases at
a price of zero. However, the price will have to be set at a level that
gives the seller a profit. Mutually beneficial transactions will occur
at any price level above the competitive level and the level repre-
senting the consumer’s maximum bid. To treat any consensual
exchange that occurs at a price level above the competitive price as
the equivalent of robbery is to ignore the difference between a
consensual and nonconsensual transaction. Hence an analogy be-
tween robbery and a transaction that occurs at a price above the
competitive level would have to be rejected as specious.
One might argue that criminal law enforcement for price fixing is
still appropriate because of the low probability of detection in anti-
trust. But detection probabilities cannot, alone, provide a justifica-
tion for applying the criminal law to an area of activity. First, the
tort system is capable of regulating conduct even when detection
probabilities are low; a low detection probability can be used as a
basis for increasing damages in the tort system, through the im-
position of punitive damages, thereby offsetting the deterrence
dilution to the low detection probability.157 Second, there are many
scenarios in the tort system in which detection probabilities are low,
but we do not point to them as reasons for criminal law enforce-
ment. Most instances of defamation are probably never detected by
victims. But no one has argued that this is a reason to extend crim-
inal law into the defamation area.
As in the previous discussion of the criminalization of market
activity, criminalization of business practices such as price fixing
often entails the grant of substantial discretion to enforcers. Price
fixing may seem to be an easy offense to define, but it is not.
157. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874-75 (1998). 
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Antitrust law has had to grapple with whether the prohibition ap-
plies to horizontal price fixing alone, or whether it also includes ver-
tical price fixing.158 The criminal provisions of the Sherman Act have
never been applied to vertical price fixing in the United States. Still,
cases have arisen in which it is unclear whether the alleged price
fixing should be characterized as horizontal or vertical.159 No-poach-
ing agreements among employers would seem to be clear instances
of price fixing, but the Department of Justice only recently announ-
ced, after years of investigations, that it would consider prosecuting
criminally in this area.160
Because of the discretion enforcers have in the area of price
fixing, there will inevitably be instances in which enforcers treat
similar cases unequally. Take for example current Department of
Justice activity on price fixing. The Department has generated enor-
mous fine payments by pursuing foreign firms for cartels in which
they participated in the last two decades.161 At the same time, major
domestic technology firms, such as Apple and Google, and other im-
portant domestic employers of software engineers, such as Disney
and Pixar, have participated in “no poaching” agreements—that is,
agreements not to hire employees away from one another.162 These
no-poaching agreement investigations have been treated as civil
158. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882, 898-99
(2007) (holding that the rule of reason analysis applies to vertical resale price maintenance
agreements); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1911)
(finding vertical resale price maintenance agreements per se prohibited by the Sherman Act). 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 335 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding the
district court’s finding that Apple’s conduct in establishing vertical agreements with ebook
publishers constituted horizontal price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act).
160. See Daniel G. Swanson et al., DOJ Crackdown on Employee Recruiting and Compensa-
tion, LAW360 (Dec. 5, 2016, 12:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/865254? sidebar=true
[https://perma.cc/AA9L-HJQR]. 
161. On recent international antitrust enforcement and financial penalties imposed on
foreign firms, see Ankur Kapoor & Douglas E. Rosenthal, U.S. Criminal Antitrust Implicating
Japanese at Alarming Rate, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (June 27, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://asia.nikkei.
com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Kapoor-and-Rosenthal-US-criminal-antitrust-
implicating-Japanese-at-alarming-rate?page=1 [https://perma.cc/3965-XDVA].
162. See, e.g., Ryan Faughnder, DreamWorks Animation, Disney Sued over Alleged No-
Poaching Scheme, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/
envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-dwa-disney-sued-poaching-20140908-story.html [https://perma.cc/
7T8H-VF7N]; Swanson et al., supra note 160.
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antitrust cases, even though the activity is at bottom the same as
price fixing.163
From the public choice perspective, the disparate treatment of
foreign price-fixing cartels and domestic no-poaching agreements
in the high technology sector would be easily explainable. The fac-
tors of enforcer discretion and high offender stakes are present in
this area of enforcement,164 though probably to a lesser degree than
in drug prohibition.
These arguments suggest that in the area of price fixing, the role
of criminal law enforcers should be more limited than it is today.
The presumption should be that this is an area of private enforce-
ment through lawsuits, perhaps class actions brought on behalf of
consumers or other victims of price fixing.165 Public enforcement
agencies may be able to offer a benefit to society in the detection
sphere.166 Public enforcement agencies can use the state’s resources
to investigate whether a price-fixing cartel exists.167 However, after
the public enforcement agency has discovered information on the
existence of a cartel, the remaining work should be left to private
class action attorneys. The state has no special advantage in de-
termining the magnitude of the losses suffered by consumers, and
criminal law has no special functional role to play in this area.
Because of the loss to potential consumers (the benefit denied),
damages to actual consumers would generally be insufficient to
internalize the total social harms suffered as the result of price
fixing. There are several ways to remedy this problem. One ap-
proach would permit the state to impose a fine approximating the
deadweight loss resulting from the cartel. Another approach would
apply a multiplier to the compensatory damages award and permit
the class action lawyers to take their compensation out of the
amount awarded above the level required to fully compensate
163. See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 160.
164. Lobbying expenditures reveal high offender stakes in this area. The technology sector
has been an influential funding and lobbying force in recent years. See Ethan Baron, Google
Dominates Tech Sector Lobbying: Report, SILICONBEAT (Sept. 22, 2016, 5:48 PM), http://www.
siliconbeat.com/2016/09/22/google-dominates-tech-sector-lobbying-report/ [https://perma.cc/
8QHW-Q9ZK].
165. See Denger & Arp, supra note 100, at 44 (arguing that criminal and civil enforcement
should at least be coordinated and balanced).
166. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 42, at 45-46.
167. See generally id.
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consumers. In each of these approaches the fine revenue in excess
of the amount needed to compensate could be used to reward public
law enforcers, as long as their efforts have contributed to uncover-
ing the cartel. All of this is subject to the proviso that extraordinary
methods of detection—such as phone tapping and invasions of prop-
erty to search—should not be within the arsenal of investigatory
methods used to discover evidence of price fixing.168
V. THE CASE AGAINST PRISON
The types of punishment identified within this framework vary
from imprisonment, to monetary fines, to damages claims from
victims, to public revelation. In terms of effect on potential offend-
ers, these punishments vary according to the individual. Monetary
fines or damages awards would have little effect on impecunious
individuals, who would be unable to pay the fine or damages a-
ward.169 Similarly, public revelation of criminal behavior would have
little effect on individuals who are not concerned with their rep-
utations.170 Imprisonment is the most basic form of punishment
because it is capable of imposing a harm on every individual of-
fender, whether impoverished or unconcerned about reputation.171
Perhaps because of this basic nature of imprisonment, it has
been viewed as the most severe of the punishments typically im-
posed. However, the perceived severity of imprisonment, like the
severity of monetary fines, depends on the characteristics of the
convicted offender.172 Among offenders who would experience a high
168. See, e.g., Allan Fels, A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
489, 494 (2010) (“A regulator that obtains results or detects unlawful behavior by illegal or
improper use of investigatory powers, e.g., unauthorized phone tapping or by oppressive
behavior, is generally seen as contributing negative value to the public.”).
169. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Incentive Compatibility Constraint as an Explanation for
the Use of Prison Sentences Instead of Fines, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 179, 180-81 (1997)
(arguing that fines should not be used because “the typical criminal has extremely low
wealth”).
170. See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 100, at 372-73.
171. One traditional justification for using prison instead of fines is that criminals are often
judgment-proof with respect to the penalties or damages judgments associated with a serious
crime. Under this view, fines are preferable because they are cheaper to administer, except
when prison sentences are necessary to secure deterrence. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 97-98 (1984).
172. See, e.g., id. at 90.
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opportunity cost from prison, incarceration would be viewed as a
severe punishment, and probably more severe than being forced to
pay a fine equal to the forgone wages from being excluded from the
labor market during the time of imprisonment.173 However, among
offenders who would experience a low opportunity cost, imprison-
ment may not be viewed as a severe punishment.174 Of course, this
statement assumes that imprisonment does not also include severe
material deprivation or risk of harm. If imprisonment also includes
severe material deprivation, then even criminals whose opportunity
cost of imprisonment is low would not view imprisonment as a mild
punishment.175
Consider, for a moment, the view of an offender whose opportu-
nity cost of imprisonment is low. For such an offender, the threat of
imprisonment might not serve as a serious deterrent to unlawful
conduct. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that for offenders whose
environments are already dangerous and chaotic, prison may pro-
vide an escape from relatively harsh conditions.176 If the offender is
173. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 7, at 193-98.
174. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 171, at 97-98.
175. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from
Drug Convictions: The Importance of an Individual’s Reputation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 181-
85 (1992).
176. See, e.g., Theodore Dalrymple, Why Do Quite a Lot of Prisoners Prefer Life Inside to
Life “On the Out”? Former Prison Doctor Theodore Dalrymple Suspects It Is Because Our
Society Is Producing Fewer Independent and Responsible Adults, SOC. AFF. UNIT (Apr. 29,
2008), http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/001773.php [https://perma.cc/G5UD-
LS27] (“In addition, about a third of prisoners, according to my rough estimate, prefer life in
prison to life outside.... Why do quite a lot of prisoners prefer life inside to life ‘on the out’?
Freedom is their enemy or at any rate their downfall. They do not know what to do with it.
Impulsive, they do the first thing that comes into their head, which all too predictably leads
to disaster. They feel safe in prison, not from their fellow-men, but from themselves. They are
like de-railed trains that are put back on the tracks. Incapable of self-regulation, they
nevertheless like routine, predictability and boundaries. [The] prison provides for them, often
for the only time in their lives; they have never achieved them for themselves. Prison is for
them a refuge from chaos, the nearest thing they will ever know to a spiritual retreat.”).
There are numerous stories of prisoners boasting of their living conditions. See, e.g.,
Admitted Serial Killer Says He’s Looking Forward to ‘Retirement’ in Prison, TRIB. MEDIA WIRE
(Mar. 3, 2016, 1:41 PM), http://wnep.com/2016/03/03/admitted-serial-killer-says-hes-looking-
forward-to-retirement-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/MYV2-V2WA] (“Adams said he doesn’t want
the death penalty, nor does he want to do his time in the rougher ‘gladiator’ prisons in Cali-
fornia. Referring to prison in Virginia, he said, ‘it’s retirement... Three hots and a cot.’” (omis-
sion in original)); James Slack, Prisoners Who Boasted of Easy Life on Facebook Lose Their
Perks: Pair Face Extended Sentences After Justice Secretary Demands Authorities ‘Throw the
Book’ at Them, DAILYMAIL.COM (Aug. 15, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
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also committed to crime as a vocation, prison may offer the offender
a chance to learn new skills that will aid him in the future in
committing crimes.177 For the foregoing reasons, imprisonment, far
from being a deterrent, might appear to be an untroubling or even
desirable option for some offenders.
Viewing prison in general economic terms, imprisonment becomes
less of a deterrent as the price of time in prison falls relative to the
price of time outside of prison.178 Once the relative price of prison
time falls below unity, the threat of prison no longer deters.179 The
relative price of prison could fall to such a level because prison
conditions are not perceived as worse than conditions outside, or
because prison is perceived as a place where a criminal can develop
skills in criminal activity or promote himself within a criminal
organization.180 Prisons offer economies of scale and scope, or more
article-2395197/Prisoners-boasted-easy-life-Facebook-lose-perks-Pair-face-extended-
sentences-Justice-Secretary-demands-authorities-throw-book-them.html [https://perma.cc/
NUV2-HYDJ]; Murray Wardrop, Gordon Ramsay: ‘I Can’t Believe How Easy Life Is in British
Prisons,’ TELEGRAPH (June 9, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ foodanddrink/food
anddrinknews/9320916/Gordon-Ramsay-I-cant-believe-how-easy-life-is-in-British-prisons.html
[https://perma.cc/9TZR-RW3U] (“Ramsay, 45, said he was astounded when he discovered
convicted criminals were given five meal choices every night and constant access to television,
video games and gym facilities. The restaurateur visited London’s Brixton Prison to film
Behind Bars, a Channel 4 show in which he teaches 12 inmates to cook and sell their Bad
Boys’ Bakery produce to businesses on the outside. However, he said he was disappointed
with the prisoners’ lack of work ethic, claiming the lax regime inside gave them no incentive
to toil over a stove.”).
177. See, e.g., Paul Gendreau et al., The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism 6-7 (1999),
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ffcts-prsn-sntncs-rcdvsm/ffcts-prsn-sntncs-
rcdvsm-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J8C-Q56L].
178. See, e.g., id. at 4-6.
179. See, e.g., id.
180. See, e.g., DAVID SKARBEK, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE UNDERWORLD: HOW PRISON
GANGS GOVERN THE AMERICAN PENAL SYSTEM 47-72 (2014) (describing the functions of the
prison gang); Prison Gangs—Inside the Mind of a Gangmember: From a Correctional Officers
Perspective, PRISONOFFENDERS.COM, http://www.prisonoffenders.com/prison_gangs.html
[https://perma.cc/M8RG-9HKE] (“Prison gangs have dangerous reputations and the deadlier
a gang is known to be, the more evil [its] members are expected to be. Prison gangs compete
for the most dangerous of reputation. Members of prison gangs such as the Texas Syndicate
and Mexican Mafia are expected to commit terrible crimes in the name of the [organization’s]
cut-throat reputations.... Many prison offenders in gangs are institutionalized and lack any
understanding about responsibility. Prison gang members who are used to being fed, clothed,
and sheltered in prison are rarely able to walk a straight line once released. With little or no
skills of surviving in a free society, prison gang members quickly return to the comforts of an
institutionalized life. It is common to find ex-con gang members pan handling on the streets
or resorting to crimes such as robbery, burglary or theft.”). 
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appropriately agglomeration externalities, that enhance invest-
ments in crime as a vocation.181
One might respond that any offender for whom imprisonment
seems desirable should be forced to experience some type of material
deprivation along with imprisonment to make the prospect of im-
prisonment less desirable. There are many difficulties with this
proposed solution. Authorities would not know in advance how to
distinguish offenders who prefer imprisonment from those who do
not. Fearing material deprivation, no prisoner would admit to hav-
ing a preference for imprisonment, or even that he viewed impris-
onment as a light punishment. Such a policy might violate the
constitutional constraint on cruel and unusual punishment, and
would surely enhance the power of enforcement agents to demand
bribes from offenders to avoid imprisonment. Probably because of
these factors, the only type of deprivation commonly observed today
in the United States is solitary confinement.182 But with the wide-
spread dissemination of cheap forms of rapid communication by
voice and video, solitary confinement is virtually impossible to ad-
minister today.183 A recent television news report included a sub-
stantial video interview with a criminal serving a term in solitary
confinement.184 From his solitary cell, the prisoner managed a se-
ries of prison protests across the country, an endeavor that required
nearly continuous communication with other prisoners in different
prisons.185
181. Internally, many prisons today appear to serve as criminal enterprise hubs, where
different criminal gangs manage their operations both within and outside of the prison, and
coordinate with other criminal organizations in the same or different lines of criminal activity.
See, e.g., SKARBEK, supra note 180, at 47-72; Horror in the Jungle: Carnage at a Prison in the
Amazon, ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21713900-
massacre-manaus-shows-competition-among-gangs-increasing-carnage-prison [https://perma.
cc/UJ59-TDL7] (“Guards often do little more than patrol the perimeters, leaving gangs free
to manage far-flung criminal operations via mobile phones.”).
182. For more on solitary confinement, see Solitary Confinement Facts, AM. FRIENDS SERV.
COMMITTEE, https://www.afsc.org/resource/solitary-confinement-facts [https://perma.cc/RPY4-
7P3Q].
183. See, e.g., Antonia Hylton, We Spoke to the Inmate in Solitary Who Inspired a National
Strike Against ‘Modern-Day Slave Conditions,’ VICE NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016, 12:15 PM), https://
news.vice.com/topic/prison-strike [https://perma.cc/3NQC-DK2L] (telling a story based on an
interview conducted over Skype with a prisoner in solitary confinement).
184. See id.
185. See id.
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The argument advanced here—that prison is not necessarily a
deterrent for every offender—should be distinguished from that
presented in an article by Steven Levitt. Levitt argued that the
prospect of serving a prison term provided an effective constraint on
the use of monetary fines.186 Any offender would know that he can
always choose to refuse to pay the fine and serve a prison term in-
stead.187 Thus, any time the monetary fine rose above the offender’s
assessment of the cost of imprisonment, he would choose imprison-
ment.188 My argument here is different, because I contend that im-
prisonment by itself is not necessarily a deterrent to some offenders.
For such offenders, imprisonment is equivalent to a fine of zero, or
to a reward for commission of a crime.
The existence of potential criminals who do not view imprison-
ment as a deterrent requires a different view of punishment for such
offenders. For the violent, or for the ones who would impose great
harm on others, the incapacitation function becomes the sole jus-
tification for imprisonment. Such offenders cannot be deterred by
ordinary imprisonment, so the only rational basis for imprisoning
them is to prevent them from harming others.189 The category of
offenders who would be likely to harm others in the future pre-
sumptively includes those who have already committed offenses
that have harmed others—murder, rape, robbery, et cetera.190
For offenders who are both unlikely to be deterred by prison and
unlikely to impose harm on others, the utilitarian basis for impris-
onment is nonexistent. Such offenders should not be imprisoned. It
might seem plausible to assume at first that few offenders would fall
in this category, but that assumption would be unwarranted.191
Among the population of female prisoners, for example, there are
many, probably the majority, who pose no substantial risk to others
186. See Levitt, supra note 169, at 180-81.
187. See id. at 185-87.
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., Gendreau et al., supra note 177, at 2, 21.
190. Not all forms of incapacitation are the same. Criminals who are dangerous and
unlikely to be deterred should be held for incapacitation, but their conditions can be altered
to reduce the likely harm to others outside of prison or in the future. Preventing the
transmission of criminal activity skills might require policies to reduce interactions among
certain groups of prisoners (for example, skilled and unskilled). 
191. See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Inimai Chettiar, 39% of Prisoners Should Not Be in
Prison, TIME (Dec. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4596081/incarceration-report/ [https://perma.cc/
39RW-6KJB].
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and for whom imprisonment has not proven itself a substantial de-
terrent.192 These offenders should be released from the prisons and
put under some other form of regulation, such as probation. Among
the population of drug offenders, both male and female, there are
many who pose no substantial risk to others and for whom impris-
onment is not a substantial deterrent.193 Because the criminal law
should not control drug transactions generally,194 imprisonment
would also be inappropriate for the nonviolent (or nondangerous)
drug offenders for whom imprisonment is a substantial deterrent.
What about offenders who would pay a significant amount to
avoid prison? For the ones who are unlikely to harm others, the
utilitarian case for imprisonment is weak. Consider, for example, a
business executive who participated in a price-fixing cartel. The
motivation for participation was solely financial, and given this, a
penalty that completely eliminates any financial gain should eli-
minate the incentive to engage in such conduct,195 and at the same
time provide a fund for compensating victims.
These arguments suggest that among offenders who are unlikely
to harm others, the state should try to determine whether prison
would really serve as a deterrent, and whether alternative forms of
discipline such as probation, rehabilitation programs, or monetary
fines, can serve equally well as deterrents.196 Prison should not be
used for nonharmful offenders unless it serves as a significantly
more effective deterrent than less costly alternatives.
The foregoing arguments are all consistent with the Classical
and Neoclassical models of law enforcement.197 If prison is not an
effective deterrent—say because it provides nothing more than a
safe resting period between bouts of criminal activity outside of
prison—then it should not be used as a punishment unless it serves
192. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH
INVOLVING PRISONERS 36-37 (Lawrence O. Gostin et al. eds., 2007), https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK19882/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK19882.pdf [https://perma. cc/49XQ-2U3G].
193. See, e.g., Eisen & Chettiar, supra note 191.
194. See supra Part IV.A.
195. On appropriate penalties for antitrust offenses, see Hylton, supra note 152, at 2072-
83.
196. See, e.g., Greg Berman, Alternatives to Incarceration Are Cutting Prison Numbers,
Costs and Crime, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2013, 12:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2013/jul/04/alternatives-incarceration-prison-numbers [https://perma.cc/FY9R-PDAG].
197. See supra notes 34-55 and accompanying text.
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a socially valuable incapacitative role. From the perspective of the
Classical model, the central question is whether prison sentences
eliminate the gain from criminal activity.198 If prison fails to “take
the profit out of crime,” which appears to be true in many cases,
then it clearly fails the most basic aim of a punishment system.199
Moreover, if prisons serve as schools for the development of skills
in areas of criminal conduct (for example, burglary, robbery), then
not only does the prison system fail to eliminate the gain to some
criminal offenders, but also it ensures that they will return to the
same activity with more harmful potential in the future.200
The Neoclassical model emphasizes the trade-off between deter-
rence and the cost of law enforcement (including punishment), and
implies that imprisonment should not be used when less costly and
equally effective alternatives are available.201 Prison is expensive:
the average cost of holding a prisoner in the United States was
$31,286 in 2010, with a maximum of over $60,000 in New York.202
In addition, most prisoners would be able to contribute to the
economy by working, so the loss of their contributions to the work-
force, and to the household, should be included in the cost of im-
prisonment.203 The resources wasted by the prison system could be
better used in many other areas, such as education or health care.204
A. Public Choice and Prison
The public choice model provides an additional set of reasons for
limiting the use of prisons. The prison system in the United States
has created an industry that argues in favor of its maintenance and
198. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Gendreau et al., supra note 177, at 6-7.
201. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
202. See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 9-10 (2012), https://storage.googleapis.com/
vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/price-of-prisons-what-incarceration-costs-taxpayers/
legacy_downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP65-
QNGQ].
203. See, e.g., Bryce Covert, Here’s How Much It Costs to Have a Family Member in Prison,
THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Sept. 15, 2015, 2:31 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/heres-how-much-it-
costs-to-have-a-family-member-in-prison-64cd7c3a37dd/ [https://perma.cc/7RCV-MWWK].
204. See, e.g., Steven Hawkins, Education vs. Incarceration, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://prospect.org/article/education-vs-incarceration [https://perma.cc/43XT-6HVN].
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expansion.205 Public sector prison guards and private sector prisons
have a strong interest in laws that impose imprisonment as pun-
ishment for violation.206 These groups lobby behind the scenes for
expanded imprisonment, and fund politicians who promise to in-
crease prison sentences or to use prison more widely as punish-
ment.207
Because of the political power of public sector unions, any
proposal to expand the use of imprisonment should be viewed with
some degree of suspicion. Politicians depend on public sector unions
for fundraising and for votes.208 Prisoners, on the other hand, do
not present an effective voting or fundraising faction in opposition
to the public sector unions.209 The general tax-paying public, which
has no reason to closely monitor the connection between politicians’
spending on prisons and support from public sector unions, also gen-
erally fails to form a voting bloc in opposition to public sector prison-
employee unions.210 The classic public choice failure observed by
Mancur Olson emerges: a concentrated interest group gains exces-
sive control over the public’s use of resources.211 As a result, impris-
onment is expanded, and prison sentences extended, beyond the
level appropriate for punishment.212
205. On lobbying by public and private sector prisons for expanded sentences, see Ed
Krayewski, Are For-Profit Prisons, or Public Unions, the Biggest Lobby No One’s Talking
About?, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (June 2, 2015, 5:02 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2015/
06/02/are-for-profit-prisons-or-public-unions [https://perma.cc/QG33-SFZR]; see also Evelyn
Nieves, California Examines Brutal, Deadly Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1998), http://www.
nytimes.com/1998/11/07/us/california-examines-brutal-deadly-prisons.html [https://perma.
cc/69CR-ZWYW] (noting that the prison guard union in California is the second most powerful
union after the California teachers union).
206. See Nieves, supra note 205.
207. See Andrea N. Sanchez, Private Prisons Spend Millions on Lobbying to Put More
People in Jail, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (June 23, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
private-prisons-spend-millions-on-lobbying-to-put-more-people-in-jail-58e048bb37dd/ [https://
perma.cc/8ED2-8YUJ].
208. See, e.g., id.
209. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Should Felons Be Allowed to Vote from Behind Jail Bars?,
L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2016, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-california-
felons-voting-rights-20160714-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/L3L7-NKTK].
210. See John O. McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector Unions,
HOOVER INST.: POL’Y REV. (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.hoover.org/research/case-against-public-
sector-unions [https://perma.cc/6YE8-ZTAC].
211. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 141-48 (2d prtg. 1971).
212. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 207.
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The data on incarceration support the public choice model. As
crime rates have fallen in the United States and in other countries,
prison use has not fallen with them.213 This is because, as the crime
rate has fallen, legislators have at the same time lengthened sen-
tences for less serious crimes and extended incarceration to a wider
set of offenses.214 Of course, one could argue that this is at best in-
complete evidence in favor of the public choice explanation because
longer sentences should both increase the prison population and
reduce the crime rate.215 The evidence of declining crime coupled
with more extensive use of prisons could be largely attributed to the
deterrent effect of prison sentences.216 To distinguish the public
choice and deterrence accounts, one would have to identify specific
types of prison expansion that could not be attributed to the
deterrence function.
Probably the best evidence favoring the public choice model is the
dramatic explosion since the 1980s in the number of women in-
carcerated.217 At present, the United States incarcerates women at
a far greater frequency than other developed countries.218 Thailand
and El Salvador are close,219 but El Salvador’s high female incarcer-
ation rate is due to the country’s unusual policy of imprisoning
213. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
27 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014), https://www.nap.edu/read/18613/chapter/3#27 [https://
perma.cc/9SGV-XMVP].
214. See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., STATE REFORMS REVERSE DECADES OF INCAR-
CERATION GROWTH 1 (Mar. 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2017/03/ State_
Reforms_Reverse_Decades_of_Incarceration_Growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7D9-FNSV].
215. See, e.g., Toby Helm & Jamie Doward, Longer Prison Terms Really Do Cut Crime,
Study Shows, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jul/
07/longer-prison-sentences-cut-crime [https://perma.cc/3LD4-9QMP].
216. See, e.g., VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 2 (Nov. 2010), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deter
rence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY96-Y3LW].
217. See Women’s Incarceration Rate: United States 1910-2014, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/women_rate_1910-2014.html [https://perma.cc/
ADQ3-JMFT].
218. See Niall McCarthy, No Country Incarcerates More Women than the U.S., STATISTA
(Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.statista.com/chart/2755/no-country-incarcerates-more-women-
than-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/KM9G-P7TK]. 
219. See Aleks Kajstura & Russ Immarigeon, States of Women’s Incarceration: The Global
Context, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/women/ [https://perma.
cc/67FS-23SK].
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women who get abortions.220 Thailand’s rate is close to the United
States, and it is almost entirely due to severe sentences given to
women who sell drugs in an effort to escape poverty.221
The explosion in the number of incarcerated women in the Unit-
ed States is shown in Figure 2. The women’s incarceration rate grew
dramatically over the 1980s and 1990s. The increase, from roughly
20 per 100,000 in 1980 to almost 140 per 100,000 in the mid-2000s,
represents a scaling up by a factor of six in the incarceration rate of
women over the last thirty years. The total population of women
incarcerated has increased from 26,378 in 1980 to 215,332 in 2014,
an increase of more than 700 percent.222 These increases have re-
sulted not because women have become more violent or criminalistic
since the 1980s, but mostly because of drug laws that ensnare them,
often for not much more than being associated with men who deal
drugs.223
220. See Abortion in El Salvador: Miscarriage of Justice, ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2016), http://
www.economist.com/news/international/21711033-where-miscarrying-can-mean-life-jail-
miscarriage-justice [https://perma.cc/D5YW-E5T6].
221. See Thai Women Pay the Price of Drugs, NATIONAL (June 24, 2014), http://www.the
national.ae/world/southeast-asia/thai-women-pay-the-price-of-drugs [https://perma.cc/RJF9-
R7F4].
222. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS 1 (Nov.
2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Incarcerated-Women-
and-Girls.pdf [https://perma.cc/329K-GBYE].
223. See, e.g., Valentina Zarya, This Is Why Women Are the Fastest-Growing Prison Popula-
tion, FORTUNE (Dec. 10, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/12/10/prison-reform-women/
[https://perma.cc/K8SR-ZVH5]. For statistics on crime, gender, and incarceration, see SEN-
TENCING PROJECT, supra note 222; see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, WOMEN IN THE CRIMIN-
AL JUSTICE SYSTEM: BRIEFING SHEETS (2007), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Women-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System-Briefing-Sheets.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YQP4-9DF4].
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Figure 2. Women’s Incarceration Rate in the United States224
The massive increase in the number of incarcerated women in the
United States imposes an enormous tax on society’s welfare. Incar-
ceration serves no substantial deterrence function in these cases
because the women are often punished for being involved with men
who violated the law. The great majority (over 60 percent) of them
are incarcerated for nonviolent crimes,225 and of the women con-
victed of violent crimes, the vast majority are for simple assaults,
mostly against other women with whom they have had some prior
relationship.226 Mass imprisonment of women is especially harmful
to society because the incarcerated women are prevented not only
from working in the formal job sector, as is true of incarcerated 
224. PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, supra note 217.
225. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 223, at 4.
226. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN
OFFENDERS 2-3 (Oct. 2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/wo.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CQ63-TRXL]. Moreover, 40 percent of the women involved in violence were perceived by their
victims to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. See id. at 3.
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men, but also from working informally by providing support to child-
ren.227
Although this is only a preliminary look at the data, it suggests
that the typical picture one has of a criminal—someone who leaps
from the bushes to violently assault a law-abiding stranger—de-
scribes almost none of the women currently serving time in jail or
prison in the United States. The vast majority are incarcerated be-
cause of nonviolent crimes, or violence related to domestic or rela-
tion-based disputes.228 These sorts of violent crimes are unlikely
ever to be substantially deterred through punishment; they often
result from “heat of passion” moments when offenders are not think-
ing rationally about the consequences of their actions.229 The crime
that has generally concerned the public, by contrast, is the sort that
involves rational predatory conduct: holding people up for money or
rape. And because the conduct is rational, it appears capable of
being deterred through punishment. This sort of rational predatory
crime appears to be the near exclusive preserve of men.230 The up-
shot is that the vast majority of women convicted of crimes could be
given much milder prison sentences, or assigned to out-of-prison re-
habilitation programs, without substantially affecting the deter-
rence of crime. That we have instead observed nearly exponential
growth in the number of incarcerated women over the last four
decades lends support to the public choice perspective on imprison-
ment.
VI. SHOULD PENALTIES BE USED TO FINANCE ENFORCEMENT?
One of the most controversial features of the criminal justice
system today is the use of fines to finance the criminal justice
system. The U.S. Justice Department study of Ferguson, Missouri,
concluded that the local police force had used fines excessively in an
227. On numbers of children with incarcerated parents and trends over time, see LAUREN
E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN 5 (Mar. 3, 2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6779-ZP5G]. The data provided, which cover the period 1991-2007, suggest that the
increase in incarcerated women is matched by an equivalent increase in the number of
children with incarcerated mothers. See id.
228. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 5, at 181.
230. See GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 226, at 2.
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effort to maximize revenues for the police department and local
courts.231 The result of this system, according to the Justice De-
partment, was that a largely white police force had used the law
enforcement process as a means of transferring resources from a
largely black local population to local police and courts.232 But this
is not the only example of alleged “policing for profit.”233 Civil for-
feiture statutes incentivize local police forces to aggressively take
property from individuals charged with violating the law.234
How should such activities be viewed within this framework? The
Neoclassical model offers a ready defense for using fines to fund law
enforcement. In Becker’s analysis, the ideal punishment compels
the offender to bear the entire incremental harm suffered by society
as a result of his conduct, which means that the offender should pay
for the harm suffered by the victim and also the incremental en-
forcement costs borne by the state.235 The reason is that enforcement
costs are triggered by the offender’s conduct. If enforcement natu-
rally follows criminal actions, then the cost of enforcement is simply
just another cost generated by criminal conduct.
It is important to note that the Becker model treats the enforce-
ment decision as a mechanical or automatic one following any
criminal act.236 If enforcement is not such a mechanical decision—for
example, if it is carried out by an agent only after weighing the
consequences of enforcement—then the mechanical assumption of
the Becker model would be inappropriate. In this alternative view,
it might be socially preferable to encourage the enforcement agent
to take no action when the cost of enforcement far exceeds any
potential gain in terms of deterrence.237
This suggests one important potential limitation to the utilitarian
justification for using criminal fines to finance enforcement. If the
social value of the deterrence brought about by law enforcement is
231. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
232. See id. at 62-70.
233. See Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 9, at 1723. 
234. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 1-2
(1996); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40 (1998).
235. See Becker, supra note 7, at 192-93.
236. See id.
237. See Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability,
4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 18, 29 (2002). 
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so small that the optimal decision is not to enforce the law, then
forcing offenders to pay for the costs of enforcement activity would
merely subsidize and further encourage wasteful law enforcement.
An ideal system would cancel the subsidy.
The first reform proposal suggested by this model, then, is that
the use of fines for financing criminal law enforcement should be
limited to areas in which the social value of deterrence through en-
forcement is substantial. When the deterrence value of enforcement
is questionable or minimal, fines should not be collected to finance
enforcement activity.
What sorts of law enforcement would fall in the questionable or
minimal value category? I have suggested several goods or service
markets currently criminalized (for example, marijuana, prostitu-
tion) from which criminal law should be ousted. In its place there
should be some tax, regulatory, or liability system. This implies that
criminal law enforcement has relatively low value as a deterrent in
these areas. Thus, fines imposed for the purpose of financing the
criminal justice system should not be permitted for offenses such as
marijuana possession.
For offenses in which there is a high deterrent value to enforce-
ment, such as robbery, fines assessed to finance enforcement seem
to be justifiable under the Becker model. They bring home to the
criminal the full cost of his conduct.238 The goal of punishment in
the area of common law crimes should be to completely deter the
conduct by wiping out any gain to the offender. But this goal merely
establishes the floor for punishment. Nothing in the framework
suggests that it would be inappropriate to enhance penalties to help
fund the criminal justice system.
I have so far not considered the public choice perspective on using
fines to finance enforcement. The public choice model indicates a
second important limitation on the use of fines to finance the crim-
inal justice system.239 Such fines tend to distort the actions of en-
forcement agents.240 Some enforcers may choose to target offenders
to maximize fine revenue. Moreover, the use of fines as a revenue
238. Cf. Becker, supra note 7, at 192.
239. See supra note 15.
240. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1176-78 (discussing how criminal justice actors have distorted incentives
when they work on commission).
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tool immediately generates questions of fairness in application. A
police officer probably would not choose to use fines in a patently
profit-maximizing manner against members of his own community.
The risk of a discriminatory enforcement strategy is enhanced when
fines are used in part as a source of revenue for enforcers.
Even judges might be affected by the use of fines as a source of
revenue for the criminal justice system. If the fines are used in part
to finance the courts as well as the police,241 judges might consider
the source of their support when examining a case that pits the
word of a police officer against the word of an alleged offender. A
judge might be inclined to lean in favor of the police officer, realizing
that the cost of constraining a police officer’s freedom to impose
fines might be a reduction in the quality of the judge’s own work
environment or in the monetary resources available for judicial pay
increases.
The public choice concerns raised so far do not require any theory
of discriminatory intent to be viewed as potentially serious. Even if
the police force and the judiciary are racially homogenous and of the
same race as the local population, the use of fines as a revenue
source could generate biases in enforcement and judging because of
the pecuniary interest of officials within the criminal justice system.
Introducing a substantial difference between the racial composition
of the officers in the criminal justice system and the racial composi-
tion of the local population amplifies the risk of incentive biasing.
If the officers are of one race and the local population is of another
race, the officers may not live among and communicate frequently
with members of the local population.242 As a result, the officers may
become relatively immune to the enforcement burdens perceived by
local residents.
241. See, e.g., Justice in Louisiana: The Ruin of Many a Poor Boy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10,
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21694525-crisis-louisianas-courts-
emblematic-broader-pathologies-both-state-and [https://perma.cc/EQ3W-APD4] (“Not just
public defenders but Louisiana’s sheriffs and prosecutors, and the courts themselves, subsist
partly on fees, fines and bonds imposed largely at judges’ discretion, mostly on defendants
who plead or are found guilty.”).
242. Given residential segregation patterns in the United States, the officers would be
unlikely to live among the local population. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993)
(exploring residential segregation in the United States and its implications for crime and
other social ills).
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To blunt the incentives for discriminatory enforcement, fines
collected to fund enforcement or justice system costs should be
allocated to uses that do not immediately benefit enforcement a-
gents and local judges. Criminal justice system officers should un-
derstand that the revenue from fines will be used to fund programs
that are unrelated to their pecuniary interests, or possibly hostile
to their interests. Money being fungible, it would not be a solution
to the conflict of interest problem for the fine revenue to be used to
pay for anything that might immediately reduce the expenses of
the police force.
One simple solution would be to dedicate such revenue to funding
criminal defense lawyers, or to job training and other educational
programs for prisoners. Under such an allocation, no enforcement
agent would impose fines with the intention of enriching himself or
improving his own working conditions. If the fine revenue were used
to support criminal defense lawyers, every criminal justice system
official would know that when he imposes a fine, he is enhancing
the likelihood that some offender, if not the one before him, would
be able to have the charges against him examined in an adversarial
process in court. If the fine revenue were used to support educa-
tional or job training in prison, every criminal justice system official
would know that when he imposes a fine, he is enhancing the like-
lihood that some offender would exit the criminal justice system and
become a productive member of society.243
The fine revenue used to fund criminal defense need not be di-
rected toward a state public defender’s office as part of this reform.
Indeed, there are reasons to question a general policy of using fine
revenue to support a state agency of public defenders. For example,
if a defendant is charged a fine for showing up late to court, sending
the revenue from the fine to the public defender’s office might harm-
fully distort the incentives of employees in the public defender’s
office. Some of the employees might realize that arriving late to
court is a method of increasing the resources of the office. Public de-
fenders have been criticized in the past for having weak incentives
243. See, e.g., Cathryn A. Chappell, Post-Secondary Correctional Education and Recidivism:
A Meta-Analysis of Research Conducted 1990-1999, 55 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 148, 162
(2004); James S. Vacca, Educated Prisoners Are Less Likely to Return to Prison, 55 J.
CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 297, 297-99 (2004).
2570 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2513
to zealously represent criminal defendants.244 If fine revenue were
directed toward the public defender’s office, the weak incentives
supposedly present already might be weakened further.
To avoid setting up perverse incentives for public defenders, the
fine revenue should be made available to the public defender only
if it cannot be attributed to some fault on the part of the public
defender—such as negligently allowing his client to skip a hearing.
An alternative would be to use the fine revenue to fund “legal
defense vouchers” that would permit criminal defendants to pay for
private lawyers. Private lawyers would have ordinary market-based
incentives to develop reputations for excellent service. A voucher
system would enhance incentives on the part of criminal defense
lawyers to develop reputations as effective legal representatives of
nonwealthy criminal defendants.
The problem of discriminatory enforcement incentives and
monetary penalties is not limited to the regulation of street crime.
Antitrust has generated a different version of the discriminatory en-
forcement problem. As noted earlier, the Department of Justice has
taken in an increasing amount of revenue from antitrust fines,245
mostly imposed on foreign (specifically Asian) firms lately.246 At the
same time, fines and prison sentences imposed on domestic firms for
entering into “no-poaching agreements,” a form of market division,
have been relatively light.247 These patterns have generated
suggestions that antitrust enforcement is either discriminatory or
deliberately structured in a manner that has had a discriminatory
impact.248 Responding to these suggestions, John M. Connor
published an empirical evaluation in which he concluded that the
244. See, e.g., EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA
EXONERATION CASES 1 (2010), http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
Innocence_Project_IAC_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4BK-F66H] (providing an empirical
analysis supporting the claim that the lack of national standards for creating and funding
public defender systems has left most states with underfunded systems, leading to over-
burdened and sometimes incompetent defense lawyers, and a lack of funding for the inves-
tigative process).
245. For statistics on antitrust fine revenue, see Criminal Enforcement: Trends Charts
Through Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforce
ment-fine-and-jail-charts [https://perma.cc/D25Q-G6LB].
246. See, e.g., Kapoor & Rosenthal, supra note 161.
247. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Kapoor & Rosenthal, supra note 161.
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evidence suggested that Asian antitrust violators have received
weaker punishments on average than their European and American
counterparts.249 However, Connor’s own data offer some support to
the discrimination hypothesis. While the ratio of fines on American
to Asian price fixers is roughly five to one in his data,250 the ratio of
commerce associated with these parties is roughly thirteen to one,251
suggesting discrimination against Asian violators if comparing
penalties per dollar of commerce affected by the cartel.
A careful study of the discrimination hypothesis in antitrust
enforcement is warranted. However, whatever the results of such a
study, the point remains that the lure of fine revenue can distort
enforcement incentives, and the distortion is likely to disfavor “out-
group” potential offenders. This is the pattern preliminarily sug-
gested by the Justice Department’s report on Ferguson and also by
the data on international antitrust enforcement.
The antitrust penalties collected by the Justice Department,
unlike those discussed in the Justice Department’s Ferguson Re-
port, are not used to finance enforcement. The Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department has a budget of roughly $165 million.252 The
annual fine revenue in the Antitrust Division in 2015 was roughly
$3.6 billion.253 The Antitrust Division is not an example of a cash-
strapped enforcement agency seeking to fill holes in its budget
through fines collected from low-level offenders. This suggests that
the distortionary effects of fines are likely to be much less severe in
the antitrust context. Still, the potential distortionary effect sug-
gests a reason, aside from international comity issues, for limiting
the reach of antitrust laws with respect to foreign conduct.
These issues in antitrust were at the heart of a dispute pitting,
briefly, Judge Posner against the Department of Justice over the
Department’s power to enforce the Sherman Act against foreign
249. JOHN M. CONNOR, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L, ON THE ALLEGED DISPROPORTIONATE
SENTENCING OF CARTEL MANAGERS 2-4 (2016), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Cartel-Column-August-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBV7-
K9AW].
250. See id. at 5 tbl.2.
251. See id. at 6 tbl.3.
252. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION (ATR): FY 2016 BUDGET REQUEST AT
A GLANCE 1, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/pages/attachments/2015/01/30/19_
bs_section_ii_chapter_-_atr.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK2C-EHF6].
253. See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 245.
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cartels. In Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., Judge
Posner initially read the relevant statute, the Foreign Trade and
Antitrust Improvement Act, in a manner that severely constrained
the power of private victims and enforcement agents to use the
Sherman Act against foreign cartels that had only an indirect effect
on American commerce.254 Judge Posner’s initial Motorola Mobility
opinion was vacated, and in a later opinion Judge Posner recognized
a distinction between private parties and government enforcers,
giving the government broader power to sue foreign cartels with
only an indirect effect.255 Judge Posner never discussed the public
choice issues. His reason for granting greater power to the Depart-
ment of Justice than to a private plaintiff was the theory that the
Department would take comity issues into account when a private
plaintiff would not.256 Unmentioned in his opinion is the greater
likelihood that private suits would not be tainted by discriminatory
incentives, because plaintiffs are seeking as much as possible in
monetary damages and are therefore unlikely to shy away from
suing any particular set of defendants, whether domestic or foreign.
Such neutrality should be viewed as an important component of law
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Rational deterrence theory has been viewed with some skepticism
in criminal law scholarship for its failure to recognize the degree to
which criminals are motivated by irrational impulses. This skepti-
cism leads naturally to a view that rehabilitation and incapacitation
are more important goals than deterrence.257 In this Article I have
adhered to the rational deterrence model, setting it out with a bit
more detail than usual and joining it with public choice theory. The
framework leads to the conclusions that the scope of criminal law is
far too broad today, the use of imprisonment excessive, and the
levying of fines to finance enforcement in need of regulatory guide-
lines. However, this is not because offenders are not fully rational,
254. 746 F.3d 842, 844-46 (7th Cir. 2014), opinion vacated on reh’g, 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir.
2015).
255. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2015).
256. See id. at 826.
257. See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 5.
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or not fully capable of learning the rules and bringing them to bear
on their own conduct. These conclusions follow from a close look at
the function and purpose of deterrence, and a consideration of the
rationality of enforcers.
